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WALKING AN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
TIGHTROPE: USE OF MILITARY FORCE TO 
COUNTER TERRORISM—WILLING THE 
ENDS
Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto*
he UN Charter reflects the drafters’ singular focus on creating a
political system to govern conflicts between states. It does not 
directly address the subtler modes in which terrorists began to operate in 
the post-World War II period. The drafters did not contemplate the 
existence of international terrorists nor their tenacity and access to 
technology. In view of the fact that terrorist groups appear to have 
reached a global sophistication, there is little doubt that international 
terrorism presents a threat with which traditional theories for the use of 
military force are inadequate to deal with, and were not contemplated 
when the UN Charter was drafted. This Article is premised on the theme 
that the right to self-defence is enrolled in a process of change. The focal 
point of state practice in the Article is the United States, which has long 
sought to articu late, through official policy, use of force as a counter-
terrorism measure.
I. INTRODUCTION
The senseless mayhem of World War I—the destruction of economic 
structures, dissipation of financial resources, and undermining of 
political stability—wiped the gloss from the traditional notion of war as a 
rational political act. The war was disastrous to both its initiators and 
victims. Millions died pointlessly and whole regimes fell. The carnage 
forced modern industrial societies to question war as an instrument of 
national policy; where the benefits of conquest (a major incentive in 
previous centuries) seemed trivial by comparison with the costs of war—
large scale death and destruction, political instability and economic 
turmoil for all involved—it seemed obvious that war was no longer a 
profitable enterprise.
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In response to the destruction of World War I, the League of Nations 
formed as an international organization to usher in collective security and 
replace a centuries old militaristic balance of power, and was an 
ambitious move to curb sovereign military excesses and guarantee world 
peace. However, it was during the League’s chequered existence that two 
issues of significance fell on the international agenda—terrorism and the 
limitation of the use of military force. With the formation of the League 
of Nations, and renewed efforts to prevent future violence, the freedom 
of states to resort to military force became more and more restricted, 
while the right of self-defence gained in significance, displacing the 
expansive right of self-preservation.
One of the League’s most significant efforts was the creation and 
adoption of the International Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an 
Instrument of National Policy (the Kellogg-Briand Pact) in 1928.1 The 
Pact prohibited war as an instrument of national policy and recognized 
the right of self-defence as a legal right, thus tacitly excluding other 
previously accepted forms of self-help as avenues legitimating the use of 
military force.2
1. Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy
art. 1, opened for signature Aug. 27, 1928, 46 U.S.T. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (entered into 
force July 24, 1929) [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]. By the time it entered into force, 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact had been signed and ratified/acceded to by a total of 59 States 
(including all the States (major and minor) that were subsequently to comprise the Axis 
Powers), almost all the States comprising the international community at that time.
2. Kellogg-Briand Pact states:
[P]ersuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an 
instrument of national policy should be made to the end that the peaceful and 
friendly relations now existing between their peoples may be perpetuated;
Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought 
only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and 
that any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national 
interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this 
Treaty . . .
Have decided to conclude a Treaty;
Article I: The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their 
respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of 
international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy 
in their relations with one another.
Article II: The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of 
all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, 
which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.
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Despite these efforts, the Kellogg-Briand Pact had its shortcomings. 
The prohibition of war, for instance, failed to be linked to a system of 
sanctions. Its preamble simply declared that a state violating the Pact 
“should be denied the benefits furnished by the Treaty.” An even more 
serious deficiency was the Pact’s failure to outlaw the use of force in 
general, as well as war. The Pact was eventually ratified by 62 states, and 
made an exception for self-defence, but failed to define it—with the 
result that the customary criteria set out in the Caroline case remained 
the only legal bases for the use of force in international affairs. Strong on 
principle but lacking an enforcement mechanism, the Pact was doomed 
to have little practical effect,3 and the League of Nations’ authority was 
challenged and whittled by a series of aggressive acts carried out by 
some of the then major powers (Japan, Italy and a resurgent Germany) 
during the mid- to late 1930s. The League’s utility was finally terminated 
by the outbreak of World War II in 1939.4
It was only after the destruction of World War II that the UN, the UN
Charter, and the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were established.5 The 
Id.
3. The pact never made a meaningful contribution to international order, although it 
was invoked in 1929 with some success, when China and the U.S.S.R. reached a tense 
moment over possession of the Chinese Eastern R.R. in Manchuria. Ultimately, however, 
the pact proved to be meaningless, especially with the practice of waging undeclared 
wars in the 1930s (e.g., the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Italian invasion 
of Ethiopia in 1935, and the German occupation of Austria in 1938). See generally
ROBERT H. FERRELL, PEACE IN THEIR TIME 260 (Lewis P. Curtis ed., Yale Univ. Press 
1952) (1968) .
4. In 1945, six years after the start of World War II, the Axis Powers were on the verge 
of total defeat and one of the blackest pages in human history about to close. By May 
1945, Hitler’s envisaged Thousand-Year Reich lay in ruins. By August, Japan was 
devastated, as the atomic bombs the United States dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
destroyed Japan’s receding hope of carrying on its war of conquest. World War II was the 
most cruel and devastating conflict in history. In terms of lives lost, geographical extent, and 
cities reduced to ashes, the struggle defies rational comprehension. Over 17 million 
combatants were killed, 27 million wounded and nearly 20 million captured or missing. 
Civilian populations were more affected by this war than any other in the past. JACKSON 
NYAMUYA MAOGOTO, WAR CRIMES AND REALPOLITIK: INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE FROM 
WORLD WAR I TO THE 21ST CENTURY 83 (2004).
5. The final step in making the United Nations Charter (UN Charter) was taken at 
Yalta, in 1945, by the “Big Three” (the U.S., the U.K. and Russia) with victory in sight. 
All the Allied States, great and small, were invited to the United Nations Conference on 
International Organization, which met in San Francisco on April 25, 1945,  to prepare the 
final instrument for the new international organization. LELAND M. GOODRICH, EDVARD 
HAMBRO & ANNE PATRICIA SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 4–8 (3d ed. 
1969).
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primary purpose of the new organization was “to maintain international 
peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures 
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the 
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.”6
Until the adoption of the UN Charter, there had been no customary 
prohibition on the unilateral resort to force if circumstances warranted it, 
and in many instruments states reserved the right to resort to force. While 
customary international law had previously accepted reprisal, retaliation, 
and retribution as legitimate responses, the UN sought to impose 
limitations on the unilateral use of force in resolving international 
disputes. Under the UN Charter the right of self-defence was the only 
included exception to the prohibition of the use of force.7
Thus, the UN Charter introduced to international politics a radically 
new notion: a general prohibition of the unilateral resort to force by 
states,8 as encapsulated in its most authoritative form in Article 2(4). The
UN Charter identified the structural defect of the international political 
system and created a network of institutions and procedures. Rather than 
standing by itself, Article 2(4) was part and parcel of a complex security 
system.9 Under the UN Charter, unilateral acts of force not characterized 
as self-defence, regardless of motive, were made illegal.10 Individual or 
collective self-defence became the cornerstone relating to use of force, 
and, since then, has been invoked with regard to almost every use of 
external military force.11
6. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1. The “Dumbarton Oaks Proposals” were taken as 
the basis for the discussions that were to lead to the UN Charter.
7. See U.N. Charter arts. 39–51.
8. Various legal instruments have reinforced the prohibition of the use of force since 
the adoption of the UN Charter. These include: Article 5 of the Pact of the Arab League, 
reaffirmed by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed in Rio de 
Janeiro on September 2, 1947; Charter of the Organization of American States (Bogota 
Charter), article 5 condemns aggression, article 15 forbids intervention, and article 18 
cites no use of force except in self defence; the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence 
(known as Pancha Sila), first formulated in April 29, 1954 between India and the PRC; 
the final communiqué of the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung of April 24, 1955 which 
gave approval to ten principles as the basis for promotion of world peace and 
cooperation. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Principles_of_Peaceful_Coexistence; 
http://en/wikipedia.org/ wiki/Bandung_Conference (last visted Feb. 17, 2006).
9. The Charter included provisions for collective and regional defence arrangements, 
and provisions on self defence.
10. See U.N. Charter arts. 2, 39–51.
11. See Jackson Maogoto, New Frontiers, Old Problems: The War on Terror and the 
Notion of Anticipating the Enemy, 51 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 3 (2004).
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However, during the Cold War, it was increasingly clear that terrorists 
were using technology to “exploit the vulnerabilities of modern 
societies.”12 With citizens tending to live, work, and travel in close 
proximity providing concentrated targets, modern societies are 
particularly susceptible to large-scale attacks and weapons of mass 
destruction.13 This fact was not lost on perpetrators of terrorism, as 
witnessed by its growing capabilities and lethalness throughout the Cold 
War era.14 The United States and Israel led the way in seeking to co-opt 
use of military force as a countermeasure against terrorism. The stance of 
the United States of “passive, reactive and patient defense” to terrorism 
in the early 1970s shifted to a “no compromise and very proactive 
approach” in the early 1980s, encapsulated in the “Reagan” and “Shultz 
Doctrines.”15 Subsequent U.S. presidents have relied on a similar tenet of 
swift, effective retribution to counter terrorism, often wrapping it up 
together with the right of anticipatory self-defence.
Though terrorism has always been high on the international agenda, it 
was the attacks on September 11, 2001 that brought the issue of terrorism 
and the international regime on the use of force into a new, urgent, and 
sustained debate. The magnitude of the September 11th attacks went 
beyond terrorism as it was known, and statements from various capitals 
around the world pointed to a need to develop new strategies to confront 
a new reality. The attacks had seemingly generated the momentum for 
the international legal system to formally co-opt military response to 
counter-terrorism within the regime of lawful force contained in the UN
Charter.
The Bush administration prepared the ground for pre-emptive attacks 
by seeking to engage the accepted right of self-defence as a justification 
for military action against rogue states. Because of the new threats, the 
United States claimed, a proper understanding of the right of self-defence
should now extend to authorizing pre-emptive attacks against potential 
aggressors, cutting them off before they would be able to launch strikes 
12. Id. at 4.
13. JESSICA STERN, THE ULTIMATE TERRORISTS 4 (1999).
14. Id. at 6 (stating that between 1970 and 1995, on average, each year brought 206 
more incidents and 441 more fatalities).
15. Shirlyce Manning, The United States’ Response to International Air Safety, 61 J. 
AIR L. & COM. 505, 519 (1996); see Ronald D. Crelinsten & Alex P. Schmid, Western 
Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO 
TERRORISM 307, 316 (Ronald D. Crelinsten & Alex P. Schmid eds., 1993).
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that might be devastating in their scale and scope.16 This aggressive 
approach became a central tenet of the United States’ strategic posture 
known as the “Bush Doctrine.”17 Like the aggressive national policies 
before it, the “Bush Doctrine” seeks to “effectively clos[e] down 
dangerous regimes before they become imminent threats”18 and, thus, 
represents a usurpation of the Security Council’ s role in global affairs.
This Article commences with an overview of the UN Charter regime 
on the use of military force. It then proceeds to tackle its central theme 
—an examination of the genesis of the current U.S. policy of proactive 
action through military force to counter terrorism. Overall, the Article is 
premised on the theme that the right to self-defence is visibly enrolled in 
a process of change and evaluates this process within the uncertain and 
indeterminate framework of state practice and the legal regime 
articulated in the UN Charter. The focal point of state practice in the 
Article is the United States, which has long sought to articulate, through 
official policy, use of force as a counter-terrorism measure. Though a 
handful of states (especially Israel) have treaded this path, it is the United 
States that has sought to articulate it as part of government policy.
16. The U.S. government’s position is encapsulated in the West Point 
Commencement Address on June 1, 2002 and officially articulated in the National 
Security Strategy, released in September 2002. See George W. Bush, West Point 
Commencement  Address (June 1, 2002) (transcript available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/200220601-3.html) (announcing  an 
expansive new policy of preemptive military action); THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 6 (2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/pdf 
[hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY]. 
 17. The “Bush Doctrine” is the term that is now widely used by journalists, scholars 
and politicians alike to describe the pre-emption strategy championed by Paul Wolfowitz, 
Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy. See Frontline: The War Behind Closed Doors, 
Chronology: The Evolution of the Bush Doctrine, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/cron.html (“Wolfowitz’s 
‘Defense Planning Guidance’ draft argue[d] for a new military and political strategy in a 
post-Cold War world. Containment, it says, is a relic of the Cold War. America should 
talk loudly, carry a big stick, and use its military power to preempt the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (‘WMD’)”).
18. Anthony Dworkin, Introduction, Iraq and the Bush Doctrine of Pre-Emptive Self-
Defense, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, June 1, 2004, 
http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/bush-intro.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006). See also
Eyal Benvenisti, Expert Analysis, Iraq and the Bush Doctrine of Pre-Emptive Self-
Defense, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, June 1, 2004, 
http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/bush-benvenisti.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
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II. USE OF FORCE AND THE UN CHARTER
Despite a general prohibition of force, the UN Charter recognizes that 
force may be necessary to restore order, and that states are entitled to 
defend themselves against aggression.19 This right is “inherent,” and 
customary international law is the yardstick upon which the degree and 
manner of self-help should be measured.20 In the face of the UN Security 
Council’s inability to control the spread of international terrorism, debate 
as to the status of previously accepted military responses under 
customary international law remains strong, and many states have urged 
for an expansion of the legitimate use of force under the Charter.
A. Article 2(4): Proscription of Force
Article 2(3) of the Charter provides that “[a]ll members shall settle 
their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”21
Article 2(4) elaborates on the need for peaceful resolution of disputes: 
“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations.”22
Article 2(4) is the provision on which present day jus ad bellum
hinges.23 The use of force in international relations proscribed in the 
19. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
20. Article 51 of the UN Charter  provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the 
exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility 
of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such 
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace 
and security. (emphasis added).
21. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3.
22. Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter provides: “All Members shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.” (emphasis added).
23. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) 
(hereinafter Nicaragua Case) (noting that article 2(4) articulates the “principle of the 
prohibition of force” in international relations and avoids the term “war”).
8 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 31:2
article includes both war and other forcible measures short of war.24 Its 
significance has been emphasized by international law scholars who 
label it “the cornerstone of this new regime” 25 that “promote[s] peace by 
prohibiting the use of force and protecting the sovereignty of the member 
states”26 and “the heart of the United Nations Charter.”27 Undoubtedly, 
the wording of Article 2(4) constitutes a considerable improvement when 
compared with Article I of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. In Article 2(4) the 
use of force in general is prohibited, rather than only war as in the 
Kellog-Briand Pact. Furthermore, under the Charter, the prohibition is 
not confined to the actual use of force but extends to the mere threat of 
force.28 Finally, the prohibition is, at least in theory, safeguarded by a 
system of collective sanctions against any offender.29
The terms “territorial integrity” and “political independence” include 
most forms of armed force, and are not intended to restrict the scope of 
Article 2(4)’s prohibition of the use of force.30 Rather, the two given 
modes of the use of force cover any possible kind of trans-frontier use of 
armed force. Thus, an incursion into the territory of another state 
constitutes an infringement of Article 2(4), even if it is not intended to 
deprive that state of part of its territory or if the invading troops are 
meant to withdraw immediately after completing a temporary and limited 
operation. In other words, “integrity” has to be read as “inviolability,”
proscribing any kind of forcible trespassing.31 Gaps that may possibly be 
left by these terms are filled by the remaining clause in Article 2(4), 
which outlaws the threat or use of force “in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”32
24. See U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4.
25. Bartram S. Brown, Special Project: Humanitarian Intervention at a Crossroads,
41 WM & MARY L. REV. 1683, 1687–88 (2000).
26. Douglas Eisner, Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era, 11 B.U. 
INT’L L. J. 195, 197 (1993).
27. See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 
1620, 1620 (1984).
28. See U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4; Kellogg-Briand pact, supra note 1.
29. See U.N. Charter, arts. 39–51 (providing the Security Council with the right to 
decide where there is a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and 
permitting necessary action to address such acts; furthermore, the Charter provides the 
rights of individual or collective self- defense).
30. Id.
31. Jackson Maogoto, Rushing to Break the Law? The “Bush Doctrine” of Pre-
emptive Strikes and the UN Charter on the Use of Force, 7 U.W. SYDNEY L. REV. 1, 33–
34 (2003).
32. U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4.
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Notably, under Article 2(4) the prohibition of interstate force is not 
applicable to UN members only. The provision forbids use of force by 
UN members against any state. Recourse to force by non-member states 
is dealt with in Article 2(6).33 Article 2(6) is a radical provision that 
seeks to bind even non-signatories to the UN Charter in contravention of 
Article 35 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which 
states that an obligation inures on a third state only if it accepts 
obligation in writing.34 However, as Article 38 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties sets forth, treaty norms may become binding on 
third states as rules of customary international law.35 When conventional 
international law crystallizes as customary law, the norm which has its 
genesis in a treaty becomes binding on a third state.
The principle of prohibition of the threat or the use of force, well 
enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, has been further elaborated 
by several consensual law-making decisions of the UN General 
Assembly including, in particular, the 1970 Declaration on Friendly 
Relations36 and the 1974 Declaration on the Definition of Aggression.37
The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, besides restating Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter,38 emphasizes that such threat or use of force 
“shall never be employed as a means of settling international issues.”39
B. Article 51: The State’s Right to Respond in Self-Defence
Having proscribed forcible self-help, the UN Charter nevertheless 
permits state actions that are reasonably necessary as self-defence in the 
face of an “armed attack.”40 The starting point for any discussion on the 
33. Id. at art. 2, para. 6.
34. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 84, para. 1, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
35. Id. art. 38.
36. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-Operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. 
Res. 2625 (XXV), at 123, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 
24, 1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations].
37. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), at 142–43, U.N. GAOR, 29th
Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974).
38. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
39. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 36, at 123.
40. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 432–
33 (1963). Professor Brownlie has categorised several Article 51 exceptions to the 
restrictions on the use of force. They are as follows:
1. acts of self-defence;
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subject of self-defence is Article 51 of the UN Charter, which states that 
“nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”41
Although the wording of the article appears clear—the right of self-
defence is generated when an attack occurs, i.e., the attack must be 
occurring before the use of force is legitimate—practice has shown that 
the picture can be more complicated.
In particular, the use of the term “inherent” has polarized 
commentators and states.42 Though the Charter does not indicate what 
rights are “inherent,” the inclusion of this term was considered 
significant enough by the drafters of the Charter to warrant its inclusion 
when revising Article 51.43 The initial draft of Article 51 made no 
mention of this “inherent right,” but it was changed to make the 
definition of self-defence acknowledge that right.44 Despite the ongoing 
debate, a major question remains whether the right of self-defence under 
Article 51 is limited to cases of armed attack or whether there are other 
instances in which self-defence may be available under Article 51. Two 
schools of thought have developed with regard to the scope of Article 51:
those who take the literal, or restrictive, approach and those who take the 
view that Article 51 is considerably broader than its terms.
2. acts of collective self-defence;
3. actions authorised by a competent international organ (e.g., the United 
Nations Security Council);
4. where treaties confer rights to intervene or where an ad hoc invitation or 
consent is given by the territorial sovereign;
5. actions to terminate trespass;
6. necessity arising from natural catastrophe; and
7. measures to protect the lives or property of a state’s nationals in a foreign 
territory.
41. U.N. Charter art. 51.
42. See, e.g., MYERS S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM 
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 232–
41(1961).
43. Maogoto, Rushing to Break the Law, supra note 31, at 25.
44. RUTH B. RUSSELL ASSISTED BY JEANNETTE E. MUTHER, A HISTORY OF THE UN
CHARTER: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1940–1945 698 –99 (1958).
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1. The Restrictionist Approach
The Restrictionist approach cites the absolute prohibition of forcible 
self-help, as set out in Article 2(4), subject only to the limited exception 
contained in Article 51.45 Under this reading, the exception permits 
recourse to self-defence only when faced with actual “armed attack,” and 
Article 51 does not contemplate anticipatory or pre-emptive actions by a 
state so threatened.46 Rather, it requires a state to refrain from responding 
with like force unless actively involved in repelling an armed attack.47 A 
significant number of writers argue that an armed attack is the exclusive 
circumstance in which the use of armed force is sanctioned under Article 
51.48 In fact, one commentator has gone so far as to state that “the 
leading opinion among scholars” is that the right of self-defence in 
Article 51 does not extend beyond armed attack.49 Furthermore, the 
International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua Case clearly stated that 
the right of self-defence under Article 51 only accrues in the event of an 
armed attack.50 Also, it is a traditional requirement of self-defence that a 
triggering event justifying a military response has already occurred or at 
least be imminent.51
Restrictionists argue that by the time of the drafting of the UN Charter, 
“self-defense was understood to be justified only in case of an attack by 
the forces of a state.”52 Professor Brownlie notes that if Article 51 of the 
UN Charter is the authoritative definition of the right of self-defence and 
it is not qualified or supplemented by the customary law, then states are 
bound by the black-letter law of the Charter and have less extensive 
grounds to support armed force undertaken outside the framework of the 
UN Charter.53
45. JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION 94–95 (Univ. Cal. Press.) (1958).
46. U.N. Charter art. 51.
47. STONE, supra note 45.
48. See, e.g.,YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 168 (3d ed., 
2001). Dinstein concludes that the choice of words in Article 51 was deliberately 
restrictive and that the right to self-defence was limited to an armed attack.
49. Id. at 168. See also Michael Franklin Lohr, Legal Analysis of U.S. Military 
Responses to State-Sponsored International Terrorism, 34 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 18 (1985).
50. In paragraph 195 of its Opinion, the Court said that the exercise of the right of 
self-defence by a state under Article 51 “is subject to the state concerned having been the 
victim of an armed attack”. Nicaragua Case, supra note 23, at 103.
51. See HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED 
CONFLICT 91–92 (1992).
52. BROWNLIE, supra note 40, at 280.
53. Id. at 279.
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Though the Charter “may be regarded as objective or general 
international law,”54 most recognized independent states have expressly 
accepted the principles and obligations of the Charter.55 Furthermore, the 
“provisions of the Charter have had strong influence on state practice 
since 1945, and the terms of Article 51 or very similar terms, have 
appeared in several important multilateral treaties and draft 
instruments.”56
2. The Counter-Restrictionist Approach
The Counter-Restrictionist approach adopts an expansionist view. 
Proponents interpret the Charter to recognize and include those rights of 
self-defence that existed under customary international law prior to its 
drafting.57 Oliver Schacter concisely states this position thus:
On one reading [of Article 51] this means that self-defense is limited to 
cases of armed attack. An alternative reading holds that since the article 
is silent as to the right of self-defense under customary law (which goes 
beyond cases of armed attack), it should not be construed by 
implication to eliminate that right . . . . It is therefore not implausible to 
interpret Article 51 as leaving unimpaired the right of self-defense as it 
existed prior to the Charter.58
54. Id. at 280.
55. Id. at 280.
56. Id. Thus, article 3 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 
provided for individual or collective self-defence in case of an “armed attack”. Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, opened for signature Sept. 2, 1947, 62 U.S.T. 
1681, 324 U.N.T.S. 21 (entered into force Dec. 3, 1948). Though articles 18 and 25 of the 
Bogotá Charter are primarily concerned with reaction to the use of force, the latter article 
refers ambiguously to “an act of aggression that is not an armed attack” and is concerned 
only with the application of “measures and procedures”, whilst the former merely refers 
to “the case of self-defence in accordance with existing treaties or in fulfilment thereof.” 
Charter of the Organization of American States arts. 18, 25, opened for signature Apr. 
30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 1609 U.N.T.S. 119 (entered into force Dec.13, 1951). The Draft 
Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the International Law 
Commission in 1949, provides in Article 12 that “[e]very State has the right of individual 
or collective self-defence against armed attack.” International Law Commission, Draft 
Declaration on Rights and Duties of States art. 12, available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/declar.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2006).
57. See Yehuda Z. Blum, The Legality of State Response to Acts of Terrorism, in
TERRORISM: HOW THE WEST CAN WIN 133, 137–38 (Benjamin Netanyahu ed., 1986).
58. Schachter, supra note 27, at 1633–34.
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Customary law traditionally recognized a limited right of pre-emptive 
self-defence according to the “Caroline criteria”:59 the necessity of self-
defence “must be instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, 
and no moment of deliberation” and the action taken must not be 
“unreasonable or excessive.”60 Martti Koskenniemi notes that the right of 
self-defence articulated in the UN Charter “should be read rationally 
against some useful purpose that the rule serves….”61 Koskenniemi 
argues that the purpose of Article 51 was “to protect the sovereignty and 
the independence of the state,”62 and that if a state feels its sovereignty 
and independence threatened by the actions of another country, it might 
be entitled to use force against that country, even if the country’s hostile 
actions had not yet risen to the level of an actual armed attack.63 Counter-
Restrictionist advocates hold the view that Article 2(4) left the right of 
self-defence unimpaired and that the right implicitly accepted was not 
confined to reaction to “armed attack” within Article 51 but permitted 
the protection of certain substantive rights:
Action undertaken for the purpose of, and limited to, the defense of a 
state’s political independence, territorial integrity, the lives and 
property of its nationals (and even to protect its economic 
independence) cannot by definition involve a threat or use of force 
“against the territorial integrity or political independence” of any other 
state.64
In line with Counter-Restrictionist proponents, it can be said that apart 
from the restrictive phrases in Article 2(4), Article 51 and Article 2(4) 
were not intended to, and do not restrict the right of member states to use 
force in self-defence as defined by customary international law. 
According to this position, Article 51 refers merely to “armed attack”
because it was inserted for the particular purpose of clarifying the 
position of defence treaties which are concerned only with external 
59. Michael Byers, Iraq and the “Bush Doctrine” of Pre-Emptive Self-Defence, 
CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, Aug. 20, 2002, http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/bush-
byers.html.
60. Id.
61. Martti Koskenniemi, Iraq and the “Bush Doctrine” of Pre-Emptive Self-Defence, 
CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, Aug. 20, 2002, http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/bush-
koskenniemi.html.
62. Id.
63. See Id.
64. D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 185–86 (1958).
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attack.65 Therefore, despite apparent specificity, the Charter leaves the 
broader customary right, which is always implicitly reserved, intact.
3. Anticipatory Self-Defence
Contrary to the permissive and expansive reading of the Charter by 
some scholars, international opinion on the impermissibility of 
anticipatory self-defence was never clearer than Israel’s 1981 attack on 
Iraq.66 Fearing that it might eventually be a target of Iraq’s efforts to 
develop nuclear weaponry, Israel reduced Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor to 
rubble.67 Israel argued vehemently that the attack was justified based on 
the right of anticipatory self-defence.68 The world was outraged and rose 
up in one voice to condemn the act.
The world was outraged by Israel’s raid on June 7 1981. “Armed attack 
in such circumstances cannot be justified. It represents a grave breach 
of international law,” Margaret Thatcher thundered. Jeane Kirkpatrick, 
the U.S. ambassador to the UN and as stern a lecturer as Britain’s then 
prime minister, described it as “shocking” and compared it to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. American newspapers were as fulsome. 
“Israel’s sneak attack . . . was an act of inexcusable and shortsighted 
aggression,” said the New York Times. The Los Angeles Times called it 
“state-sponsored terrorism”. 
The greatest anger erupted at the UN. Israel claimed Saddam Hussein 
was trying to develop nuclear weapons and it was acting in self-
defense, which is legal under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Other 
countries did not agree. They saw no evidence that Iraq’s nuclear 
energy programme, then in its infancy and certified by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency as peaceful, could be described as military,
aggressive or directed against a particular country. In any case, pre-
65. See Maogoto, Rushing to Break the Law, supra note 31, at 26.
66. The United Nations Security Council condemned the Israeli attack on the Iraqi 
nuclear reactor in a unanimous resolution adopted on June 19, 1981. S.C. Res. 487, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981).
67. Judith Miller, Was Iraq Planning to Make the Bomb? Debates by Experts Seems; 
Inconclusive, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1981, at A11.
68. Jehuda Blum, Israeli Delegate to the United Nations, Speech Before the Security 
Council (June 19, 1981), in Excerpts from Speech by Israeli Delegate to UN, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 20, 1981, at 15.
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emptive action by one country against another country which offers no 
imminent threat is illegal.69
The Security Council condemned Israel’s bombing of the Osirak 
reactor and unanimously passed Resolution 487, strongly denouncing the 
Israeli action as illegal.70 In addition to condemning the attack, the 
United States, under the authority of the Arms Control Act of 1968, 
suspended arms shipments to Israel on the grounds that those arms were 
to be used for defensive purposes only.71 Invoking the standards of 
customary international law in general, and the Caroline factors in 
particular, the international community’s opposition to the bombing as 
self-defence was based on the fact that the Iraqi threats, as well as their 
construction of the reactor, did not amount to an “armed attack” on 
Israel.72
Politicians, policymakers, and the world at large were unanimous in 
sensing that Israel’s pre-emptive strike was taking the world down a 
slippery slope.73 If pre-emption was accepted as legal, the fragile 
struc ture of international peace would be undermined. Any state could 
attack another under the pretext that it detected a threat, however distant. 
Notwithstanding the clear position taken by the Security Council and the 
international community, the parameters of a state’s “inherent” right to 
defend against armed attack is far from settled.
C. Reprisals and the UN Charter
In the heyday of anticipatory self-defence, states dealt with each other 
on the basis of reciprocity.74 There were no supranational institutions to 
69. Jonathan Steele, The Bush Doctrine Makes Nonsense of the UN Charter, 
GUARDIAN (London), June 7, 2002, at para. 2–3, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/bush/story/0,7369,728870,00.html.
70. S.C. Res. 487, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981). This was especially 
compelling given that the U.S. was a party to the resolution. See id.
71. Arms Control and Disarmament Act, 22 U.S.C. 2572 (2000).
72. U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg. at parats. 115, 299, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2288 
(June 19, 1981). It is notable that in this, as well as later Security Council condemnations 
of Israeli action, the premeditation evident in the military operation was considered an 
argument against accepting the offered justification of self-defence. For example the 
Security Council also condemned the 1985 attack by Israeli F-16s on the PLO 
Headquarters located in Tunisia, by a vote of 14–0, with the United States abstaining. 
S.C. Res. 573, U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 (Oct. 4, 1985).
73. Paul Lewis, The UN’s Nuclear Cops Cover a Tough Bear, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 
1981, at D3.
74. Reciprocity was fundamental to the international law regime on the use of war in 
its formative stages in the sense that rules were recognized to be binding legal obligations 
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make or enforce international law. States had the right to retaliate against 
states that failed to honor bilateral or multilateral arrangements through 
use of reprisals (retaliation by force) in ways that would otherwise have 
been considered illegal. “In the absence of a supranational authority, this 
form of self-help was a way for states to get compensation for their 
losses, punish their offenders, and deter future violations.”75
The purpose of international bodies such as the League of Nations and 
the United Nations was to limit this use of force, and to provide a forum 
for the resolution of conflict in international matters so as to prevent the 
need for war. The text of the UN Charter reflects this intent and 
represents a conventional rejection of the just war theories of retribution; 
to permit reprisals would thwart the very goal to which states have 
committed themselves by membership in the United Nations.76
Many commentators believe retaliation and reprisals to be illegal under 
the UN Charter, citing the specific language of Articles 2 and 51.77
Taken together, Articles 2 and 51 comprise a minimum order in the sense 
that they protect only the primary interest in freedom from aggression 
and the right of self-defence.78 “The provisions of the Charter relating to 
the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-resort to the use of force are 
owing to the centrality of war as a legal sanction. In all instances that armed conflict 
arose, states routinely claimed legitimacy of armed measures on the enforcement of some 
international obligation or entitlement. The ever-present possibility of war and the 
measures taken by states to prepare for and carry out military security meant that that the 
apprehension of discord and hostility between the States championed self-interest. The 
relationship between the balance of power and the law of nations was intimately tied in 
with the balance of power system as a part of the law of nations. States could punish a 
state threatening the balance, and armed attack in whatever context triggered all the rights 
of self-preservation. International law was in essence primarily enforced through 
reciprocal entitlement violations (underpinned by military force)—if state A violated an 
entitlement of state B, state B was justified in violating an entitlement of state A. 
However, development of military technology exposed the danger of potential escalations 
of entitlement violations leading to international anarchy, hence the need to replace 
politics with legal principles as the yardstick for governing war or resort to war. See
HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY (2d ed. 1995).
75. Stéphanie Giry, New World, Old Law: Would a Unilateral Strike Against Iraq 
Ever Have Been Legal? LEGAL AFFAIRS Jan./ Feb. 2003, at 21.
76. See Guy B. Roberts, Self-Help in Combating State-Sponsored Terrorism: Self-
Defence and Peacetime Reprisals, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 243, 286 (1987). In the 
case of Israel, however, the United States has sometimes insisted, before condemning a 
reprisal by Israel, that the terrorist act that prompted the reprisal also be condemned. 
William V. O’Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence, and Self-Defence in Counterterror Op-
erations, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 421, 433 (1990).
77. Roberts, supra note 76, at 282.
78. MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 42, at 121–24.
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universally regarded as prohibiting reprisals which involve the use of 
force.”79 These authorities conclude that the UN Charter requires states 
to settle disputes peacefully under Article 2(3) and prohibits all forms of 
forcible self-help other than the exercise of self-defence within the 
meaning of Article 51.
The Security Council expressed its view of the status of reprisals in 
1964 when it censured Great Britain for carrying out a reprisal against 
the Yemeni town of Harib in retaliation for alleged Yemeni support of 
the anti-colonial struggle in Aden.80 After several Yemeni attacks on the 
South Arabian Federation, the British commenced air attacks on Yemen 
in 1964.81 The United Kingdom Representative, after discussing the 
series of Yemeni attacks, stated:
It will also be abundantly plain that, contrary to what a number of 
speakers have said or implied, this action was not retaliation or a 
reprisal . . . . There is, in existing law, a clear distinction to be drawn 
between two forms of self-help. One, which is of a retributive or 
punitive nature, is termed “retaliation” or “reprisals;” the other, which 
is expressly contemplated and authorized by the Charter, is self-defense 
against armed attack . . . it is clear that the use of armed force to repel 
or prevent an attack—i.e. legitimate action of a defensive nature—may 
sometimes have to take the form of a counter-attack.82
Despite the United Kingdom representative’s delicate attempt to cloak 
the reprisals in the acceptable language of self-defence, the Security 
Council refused to be hoodwinked, denounced the actions as reprisals, 
and “deplore[d]” the British action.83 By a vote of nine to zero, with two 
abstentions, the Security Council determined that it “[c]ondemns 
reprisals as incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations.”84 The Council’s rationale was that the members of the United 
Nations contracted not to use force to achieve solutions to international 
controversies.85 A reprisal, not considered as the use of force in self-
79. BROWNLIE, supra note 40, at 281.
80. Lohr, supra note 49, at 32.
81. Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT’L L. 
1, 8 (1972).
82. U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess., 1109th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc S/PV.1109 (Apr. 7, 1964).
83. S.C. Res. 188, para. 7, U.N. Doc S/RES/188 (Apr. 9, 1964).
84. Richard Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation,  63 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 415, 429 (1969).
85. Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Legal Regulation of Resort to 
International Coercion: Aggression and Self-Defense in Policy Perspective, 68 YALE L. 
J. 1063, 1063– 64 (1958).
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defence, was, therefore, considered an illegal use of force.86 Clearly the 
Security Council took the dominant restrictionist view in international 
law in rejecting the legitimacy of any reprisal or anticipatory self-
defence.
“This de jure prohibition on reprisal found its way into documentary 
form in 1970”87 when the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in 
Accordance with the UN Charter was adopted.88 The Declaration on 
Friendly Relations tenor was emphatic that members of the United 
Nations have legally renounced the use of peacetime reprisals.89 The first 
principle provides that “[s]tates shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the purposes of the United Nations.”90 One of the duties imposed 
under this principle is to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of 
force.91
On its face, the Declaration on Friendly Relations seems to flatly reject 
the use of reprisals under all circumstances. This assertion is borne out 
by subsequent condemnations of reprisals by the international 
community. In 1972, in reaction to constant terrorist attacks by Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) elements based in neighboring Lebanon, 
it reminded and in the same breath warned Lebanon that it had an 
international legal obligation to prevent its territory from being used as a 
base for armed attacks against Israel by the PLO.92 A few weeks later on 
February 25, 1972, Israel sent forces, tanks, armored cars, heavy 
artillery, and air support into Lebanon to attack PLO bases.93 In response, 
the Security Council issued Resolution 313. When debating Resolution 
313, France denounced “these intolerable reprisals.”94 The final 
Resolution did not mince words demanding “that Israel immediately 
86. Falk, supra note 84, at 429.
87. See Michael J. Kelly, Time Warp to 1945—Resurrection of the Reprisal and 
Anticipatory Self-Defense Doctrines in International Law, 13 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y
1, 13 (2003).
88. Michael P. Scharf, Clear and Present Danger: Enforcing the International Ban 
on Biological and Chemical Weapons Through Sanctions, Use of Force, and 
Criminalization, 20  M ICH. J. INT’L L. 477, 489 (1999).
89. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 36, at 121–24.
90. Id. at 122.
91. Id. at 123.
92. O’Brien, supra note 76, at 426–27.
93. Id. at 427.
94. Id. at 436, n.87.
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desist and refrain from any ground and air military action against 
Lebanon and forthwith withdraw all its military forces from Lebanese 
territory.”95 Israel adopted a blasé attitude towards this Resolution and 
was soon back in Lebanon attacking PLO bases. The Security Council 
was once again seized of the matter. Belgium stated that “[t]he Belgian 
Government has never ceased to repudiate energetically the military 
reprisal actions undertaken by Israel against Lebanon.”96 The final 
Resolution of June 26, 1972, denounced Israel ’s actions as violating the 
UN Charter.97
About a decade later, on December 27, 1985, simultaneous bombings 
of airline offices in Rome and Vienna left twenty innocent people dead, 
including five Americans, with over eighty people injured.98 Four months 
later on April 5, 1986, a bomb explosion in a West German discotheque 
frequented by American servicemen killed two American servicemen 
and wounded 154 persons—50 to 60 were Americans.99 In both 
instances, intelligence traced the perpetrators back to Libya. In the early 
hours of April 15, 1986, U.S. Air Force and Naval aircraft 
simultaneously bombed targets in Libya. Despite the positive reaction 
from the U.S. Congress,100 both the Security Council and General 
Assembly condemned the U.S. attacks. While the Resolution to condemn 
the attack by the Security Council failed owing to vetoes by the United 
States, United Kingdom, and France, the vote in the General Assembly 
was successful.
However, the clear stance of the international community on the 
legality of reprisals wavered in the late 1980s. Beginning in July 1987, 
during the course of the Iran-Iraq War, the United States conducted 
escort operations of tankers in the Gulf. After months of volatility and 
gunboat diplomacy in the Persian Gulf, on April 14, 1988 Iranian 
submarine mines damaged a U.S. naval ship. Four days later, the United 
States retaliated with attacks that decimated two Iranian oil platforms.101
95. S.C. Res. 313, para. 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/313 (Feb. 28, 1972).
96. O’Brien, supra note 76, at 436 n.87.
97. Id. at 427–28.
98. Lary Rohter, Airlines Say They had Warnings About Possible Move by Terrorists, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1985, at A1.
99. John Tagliabue, 2 Killed, 155 Hurt in Bomb Explosion at Club in Berlin, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 6, 1986, at A1.
100. Gerald M. Boyd, Genesis of a Decision; How the President Approved Retaliatory 
Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1986, at A11. 
101. David Hoffman & Lou Cannon, U.S. Retaliates, Hits Iran Oil Platforms in Gulf, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1988, at A1.
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The next day, President Reagan stated that the United States’ action was 
“to make certain the Iranians have no illusions about the cost of 
irresponsible behavior.”102 The Reagan administration claimed the strike 
was in “retaliation”103 for mine laying by Iran and that “any further 
mining by Iran would bring harsher military reprisals.”104 In this 
instance:
[t]here was no Security Council debate on these hostilities. In some 
cases, the U.S. forces clearly acted in self-defense. In other cases, as in 
the retaliatory strikes of October 19, 1987 and April 18, 1988, U.S. 
attacks were not immediate. These actions could easily be characterized 
as preventive, deterrent measures and, just as readily, as punitive 
measures.105
The seeming indifference by the United Nations in this instance 
buttressed by other subsequent incidents, forms the basis of the view that 
the Charter does not prohibit reprisals entirely. In the late 1980s, the 
General Assembly and the Security Council appear to have adopted a 
policy inconsistent with their spoken opposition to reprisals.106 The 
Council has generally not condemned acts of reprisal which it considered 
“reasonable,” while voting to condemn actions considered excessive or 
disproportionate. 107 In so doing, the Council has appeared to indicate its 
toler ance of some proportional acts of reprisal. As one scholar observes:
There is, however, a contrary view that the Charter does not prohibit 
forcible self-help, i.e., reprisals entirely. An argument can be made that 
resorts to reprisals are both legal and desirable under the Charter. First, 
Security Council practice implies the recognition of the legitimacy of 
some type of reasonable reprisal. There is an inconsistency between the 
Security Council’s alleged principle of the illegality of all armed 
reprisals and the Council’s practice in not condemning a particular 
reprisal because it appeared reasonable. A practice of condemning only 
102. John H. Cushman Jr., U.S. Strikes 2 Iranian Oil Rigs and Hits 6 Warships in 
Battles Over Mining Sea Lanes in Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1988, at A10.
103. Major Phillip A. Seymour, The Legitimacy of Peacetime Reprisal as a Tool 
against State-Sponsored Terrorism, 39 NAVAL L. REV. 221, 224 (1990).
104. Hoffman & Cannon, supra note 101.
105. O’Brien, supra note 76, at 427.
106. Not all acts of reprisal result in Security Council condemnation. See Barry 
Levenfield, Israel’s Counter Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defense and Reprisal 
under Modern International Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 7, 35 (1982).
107. Id.
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unreasonable or disproportionate reprisals is, in effect, an affirmation of 
the right of states to resort to reasonable reprisals.108
Therefore, under recent UN practices, the status of reprisals may be 
viewed as illegal de jure but accepted de facto, provided they meet the 
requirement of proportionality. The troubling question of whether any 
other forcible form of self-help outside of self-defence is permitted under 
the Charter thus persists.109
Having canvassed the various avenues regarding the use of force, the 
author resists the temptation to move straight to the matter of the use of 
force and terrorism without addressing the controversial issue of 
humanitarian intervention. Though this does not strike a direct chord 
with the central theme of the Article, the most explicit form of unilateral 
action in the post-UN Charter era without UN authority has been 
premised in large part on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. 
Vestiges of this doctrine have an increasing resonance in the plethora of 
justifications for the unilateral decision by the United States at the head 
of the “Coalition of the Willing” to invade Iraq in 2003 without explicit 
UN authority.110 It is therefore only appropriate that the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention get mention.
D. Humanitarian Intervention and the UN Charter
It is significant that under the UN Charter, the third explicit exception 
to the general prohibition on the use of force, found in Chapter VIII of 
the Charter, permits actions undertaken by “regional arrangements or 
agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security.”111 Significantly, this is not a carte 
blanche, since regional alliances may undertake any action in this regard 
that is “consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
Nations.”112
108. Lohr, supra note 49, at 32–33.
109. U.N. Charter art. 51.
110. Christopher Hobson notes:
With America’s primary claims for invading Iraq—weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs) and links to terrorism—being largely discredited, bringing 
democracy to the country has increasingly become the central justification by
President Bush and his supporters for overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Christopher Hobson, A Forward Strategy of Freedom in the Middle East: U.S. 
Democracy Promotion and the “War on Terror,” 59 AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 39, 40 (2005).
111. U.N. Charter art. 52, para. 1.
112. Id.
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In general, humanitarian intervention entails a unilateral or multilateral 
intervention by a foreign power in a third country in reaction to serious 
and systematic violations of human rights by the government. Prior to the 
twentieth century, a general custom and practice of humanitarian 
inter vention existed.113 The legal doctrine finds scholarly support as early 
as the seventeenth century, when Hugo Grotius wrote that “where 
[tyrants]  . . . provoke their own people to despair and resistance by 
unheard of cruelties, having themselves abandoned all the laws of nature, 
they lose the rights of independent sovereigns, and can no longer claim 
the privilege of the law of nations.”114 This historical doctrine is 
strengthened by an emerging notion of a duty to protect civilians that has 
its genesis in the horrors of post-World War II.
For almost the entire history of the UN, it has recognized that certain 
human rights violations are beyond the pale of state sovereignty and 
constitute a threat to peace and security. Consequently, proponents of 
humanitarian intervention argue that the UN has endorsed the notion 
that sovereignty is secondary in importance to the basic human right to 
life.115
However, the matter of humanitarian intervention in the post-UN
Charter era was brought strongly to the fore with NATO’s reaction to the 
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo by Serbian forces.116 On March 24, 1999, 
113. See David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 
23 U. TOL. L. REV. 253, 258–59 (1992).
114. HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 288 (A.C. Campbell trans., 
photo reprint 1979) (1901). John J. Merriam notes:
Proponents of intervention . . . cite the British, French, and Russian 
intervention in Greece (1827-1830), the Russian intervention in Turkey (1877-
1878), and the Greek, Bulgarian, and Serb intervention in Macedonia (1903) as 
examples of humanitarian interventions that were regarded as legal operations.
John J. Merriam, Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 33 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 111, 119 (2001).
115. Id. at 122.
116. It should of course be noted that there have been previous acts premised on some 
form of pseudo-humanitarian intervention, but this has been largely within the framework 
of UN authorisation. One need only recall the acts in relation to the first Gulf War and the 
no fly zone, Somalia, Bosnia and East Timor. Though these actions may sit 
uncomfortably within the UN regime on the use of force, they nonetheless found some 
sort of legitimacy via subsequent Security Council resolutions. For a concise overview of 
these military operations, see Jackson Maogoto, People First, Nations Second: A New 
Role for the UN as an Assertive Human Rights Custodian, AUSTL. INT’L L.J. 120, 133–38 
(2000).
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without the benefit of a UN Security Council resolution expressly 
authorizing military action, NATO began a seventy-eight day air 
campaign over the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).117 The 
Kosovo operation was preceded by months of diplomatic efforts to 
resolve the region’s problems peacefully. The United Nations, OSCE, 
NATO, and the United States all participated in a multitude of diplomatic 
moves aimed at curbing the violence and reaching a political solution. 
“The legal debate over humanitarian intervention in Kosovo has been 
posed as a tension between two competing principles: respect for the 
‘territorial integrity’ and ‘political independence’ of states and the 
guarantees for human rights . . . .”118
Opponents of humanitarian intervention argue that the use of force 
against a sovereign state violates the most imperative international legal 
norms, not to mention the UN Charter.119
The major argument against a legal doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention is that it would open the door to “pretextual” intervention . 
. . this legal doctrine is founded in the custom and practice of states, 
and because it is so controversial, there has never been a universally 
accepted standard established for regulating and evaluating 
humanitarian interventions. Whatever standard exists is only that which 
can be drawn from the past practice of intervening states, and as such is 
vague and malleable.120
Proponents of the doctrine argue that despite the general prohibition on 
the use of force encapsulated in the UN Charter, a legal doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention survives, embodied in the custom and practice 
of state actors in the international arena.121 This argument is based in 
large part on the fact that the United Nations was formed to prevent the 
use of force as a means of settling disputes and to protect universal 
117. The operation’s objective was “to degrade and damage the military and security 
structure that President Milosevic (Yugoslav President) has used to depopulate and 
destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo.” William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defence, 
Prepared Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee (Apr. 15, 1999) available 
at http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/kosovo/.
118. Julie Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons 
from Kosovo, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1743, 1752 (2000).
119. See Merriam, supra note 114, at 119–21.
120. Id. at 126.
121. See generally David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian 
Intervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 253 (1992) (providing a comprehensive examination of 
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention).
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human rights.122 “Some states have opted to use force as a means of last 
resort to prevent humanitarian tragedy, while at the same time seeking to 
establish a self-defense argument in order to avoid UN sanction.”123
Traction for this argument can also be found in the observation that the 
UN Charter not only permits intervention on humanitarian grounds, it 
requires it in cases of gross and systemic human rights abuses.124 Articles 
55 and 56 of the UN Charter implore “[a]ll Members [to] pledge 
themselves to take joint action in cooperation with the Organization for 
the achievement of . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all . . . .”125
A key point that undermined NATO’s claims that the Kosovo action 
was a permissible use of force was the foggy and often incoherent 
grounds it provided as justification. Despite its seemingly humanitarian 
dimensions, the Kosovo action was not a textbook example of the 
doctrine, and was dressed up with other justifications at odds with the 
central ground of humanitarian intervention. Professor Julie Mertus 
notes:
NATO did not act only in the name of human rights. Instead, leaders of 
NATO countries offered a cafeteria of justifications for their actions. 
The Clinton Administration considered but refused to base its actions in 
Kosovo solely on humanitarian rights grounds. Instead, the 
Administration offered an array of justifications. Humanitarian 
concerns were rolled together with other factors: the need for regional 
stabilization, the stemming of refugee flows, and the need to protect 
NATO’s reputation.126
Mertus goes on to note that “by failing to specify clearly the legal 
parameters of their actions, the NATO allies exposed themselves to 
criticism suggesting that NATO was not operating under any legal 
grounds at all.” 127 Mertus follows this concern by noting that by failing 
122. See Steve G. Simon, The Contemporary Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention, CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 117, 124 (1993).
123. Merriam, supra note 114, at 114.
124. See, e.g., Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie 
and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD
229, 231–2 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974) (discussing several instances in which 
interventions occurred for humanitarian purposes).
125. U.N. Charter arts. 55, para. (c), 56.
126. Julie Mertus, The Imprint of Kosovo on the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 6 
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 527, 528 (2000).
127. See Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 
118, at 1748–49.
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to provide clear legal justifications for intervention on human rights 
grounds, human rights advocates opened themselves up to similar 
criticism that they were outside the law.
As this part of the Article has shown, the vagueness and confusion of 
conceptual elements and malleable past precedent clouds the UN Charter 
regime on the use of force. Having canvassed the various avenues 
regarding the use of force, the Article now turns to consider the use of 
military force as a counter-measure against terrorism in view of the fact 
that it is generally held to be inconsistent with the UN Charter regime on 
the use of force.
III. THE COLD WAR ERA: TERRORIST ACTION AND REACTION
During the Cold War Era, increased terrorist attacks focused attention 
on the capabilities of elite forces trained for anti-terrorist operations. The 
1976 Israeli hostage rescue at Entebbe in the aftermath of the hijacking 
of Air France Flight 139 marked the opening salvo in the use of military 
force to counter terrorism.129 About three years later, on November 4, 
1979, a mob of Iranians seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking a 
large group of employees hostage and sparking the Iranian hostage crisis. 
Five months later, the impotence of diplomatic efforts led the Carter 
administration to order a rescue effort by helicopter, but the mission was 
aborted.130 In 1981, following the release of the Iranian Embassy 
hostages, Reagan warned that when the rules of international behavior 
are violated, the U.S. policy would be one of “swift and effective 
retribution.”131 The Reagan administration was sending initial indications 
that a hard line, conceivably involving the use of military force, would be 
taken with terrorists in the future.
Two years later on April 18, 1983, sixty-three people were killed and 
one hundred twenty were injured in a 400-pound suicide truck-bomb 
attack on the U.S. embassy in Beirut, Lebanon.132 Six months later, on 
128. See Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 
114, at 1748–49.
129. See generally YESHAYAHU BEN-PORAT, EITAN HABER & ZEEV SCHIFF, ENTEBBE 
RESCUE (Louis Williams trans., Delacorte Press 1977) (1976) (providing an overview of 
the Israeli hostage rescue in Entebbe).
130. See GARY SICK, OCTOBER SURPRISE: AMERICA’S HOSTAGES IN IRAN AND THE 
ELECTION OF RONALD REAGAN 19–20 (1991).
131. Richard Halloran, Swift U.S. Retribution for Terrorists Called Doubtful, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 3, 1981, at B13.
132. U.S. Army, Timeline of Terrorism, http://www.army.mil/terrorism/1989-
1980/index.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
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October 23, 1983, in another terrorist attack, a large Mercedes truck 
exploded with such  terrific force that the headquarters of the First 
Battalion, Eighth Marine Regiment was instantly reduced to rubble with 
the loss of two hundred forty-two Amer icans.133 The Islamic Jihad 
claimed responsibility for both attacks.134 The bombings precipitated 
renewed debate over whether U.S. military forces were adequately 
prepared to deal with terrorism and whether the United States would use 
force either in anticipation of, or in response to, terrorism.
The Long Commission, in commenting upon the devastating attack on 
the U.S. Marine Headquarters in Beirut, concluded:
[S]tate sponsored terrorism is an important part of the spectrum of 
warfare and . . . adequate response to this increasing threat requires an 
active national policy which seeks to deter attack or reduce its 
effectiveness. The Commission further concludes that this policy needs 
to be supported by political and diplomatic actions and by a wide range 
of timely military response capabilities.135
The Long Commission report proved to be a turning point for U.S. 
counter-terrorism policy. Despite definitional concerns, and fundamental 
issues concerning the kind of responses the United States could lawfully 
take within the rubric of international law, the United States had grown 
tired of attacks against its interests and citizens and soon formally 
embraced military force against terrorist violence. In opting to use force, 
the United States took the position that it was necessary to accept some 
risks to ensure that every terrorist success attracted the military might of 
the United States.136 From the position of the United States, deterrence 
was premised on terrorists fearing a forceful response from the victim 
state.
A. New Frontiers on the Use of Force? Development of the Reagan and 
Shultz Doctrines
On April 3, 1984, President Reagan signed the National Security 
Decision Directive (NSDD), which assigned responsibility for 
developing strategies to counter terrorism and made clear that, while use 
of all the non-military options would be made, the United States was also 
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. U.S. Dep’t Defense., Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International 
Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983 129 (1983), available at
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AMH/XX/MidEast/Lebanon-1982- 1984/DOD-Report.
136. Brian M. Jenkins, The U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Policy Dilemma, ARMED 
FORCES J., 39, 44 (1985).
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prepared to respond within the parameters set by the law of armed 
conflict. Defense Department official Noel Koch explained that the 
NSDD “represent[ed] a quantum leap in countering terrorism, from the 
reactive mode to recognition that proactive steps [were] needed.”137
Significantly, the document incorporated some key elements: the United 
States has a responsibility to take protective measures whenever 
evidence arises that terrorism is about to be committed against U.S. 
interests; and the threat of terrorism constitutes a form of aggression and 
justifies acts in lawful self-defence.138 With this directive, the ground was 
formally laid for the “Reagan Doctrine” of swift, effective retribution.
The NSDD signaled that, as far as the executive branch was concerned, 
the debate over whether military force was inside or outside the range of 
counter-terrorism measures was over. Henceforth, the United States 
would use military force in both pre-emptive and retaliatory scenarios. 
Although then U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz had initially 
advocated only “an active defense” against terrorists,139 growing 
frustration over the inability of the United States to effectively counter 
the accelerating frequency and violence of terrorist attacks prompted him 
to re-evaluate his views on the nature of appropriate responses to 
international terrorism, further expanding the controversial new U.S. 
policy.In late 1984 at the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York City, Shultz 
asserted that the United States must be ready to use military force to fight 
terrorism and retaliate even before all the facts are known.140 This was 
the beginning of what later became known as the “Shultz Doctrine,” a 
corollary of the “Reagan Doctrine.” Shultz predicted that the increased 
terrorist attacks against strategic U.S. interests around the world in the 
years ahead would necessitate a willingness to combat it using military 
force.141 This signaled that an active policy of response by armed force to 
terrorist attacks would be followed by the United States. In the same 
speech, Shultz claimed a broad right on behalf of the United States to use 
force against terrorist threats abroad, including a policy of pre-emptive 
137. Robert C. Toth, Preemptive Anti-Terrorist Raids Allowed, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 
1984, at A19.
138. Robert C. McFarlane, Terrorism and the Future of Free Society, Speech Delivered 
at the Defence Strategy Forum (Mar. 25, 1985), in 8 TERRORISM 315, 321 (Yonah 
Alexander ed., 1986).
139. Shultz urges “Active” Drive on Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1984, at A3.
140. George Shultz, U.S. Sec’y of State, Terrorism and the Modern World, Address 
Before the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York City (Oct. 25, 1984), printed in DEP’T 
ST. BULL., Dec. 1984, at 12–17 [hereinafter Shultz, Terrorism and the Modern World].
141. Id. at 16.
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strikes in foreign countries.142 Although arguably effective and 
temporarily satisfying, the important concern was whether a policy of 
armed response was wise in view of its probable violation of 
international law. The U.S. ran the risk of incurring the massive 
condemnation that would accompany a policy of systematic use of armed 
force against terrorist attacks and the possibility of being branded an 
international outlaw.143
Even as the “Reagan” and “Shultz Doctrines” were forming, Israeli 
action was actively providing a practical manifestation of the tenet 
underlying these doctrines with regular military actions to counter 
terrorism outside its territory—in Lebanon, Syria, and Tunisia—
throughout the 1980s. The U.S. position that “[a]s a matter of U.S. 
policy, retaliation against terrorist attacks is a legitimate response and an 
expression of self-defense”144 was practically expressed in 1985 by 
Israel. On October 1, 1985, six F-15 Israel fighter-bombers unleashed a 
barrage of bombs on the headquarters of the PLO in a suburb of Tunis, 
the capital of Tunisia, responding to alleged terrorist attacks.145 Israel
Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin seemed to echo Reagan and Shultz 
when he stated: “[w]e decided the time was right to deliver a blow to the 
headquarters of those who make the decisions, plan and carry out 
terrorist activities.”146 The UN Security Council was swift to vigorously 
142. Id.
143. ERNEST EVANS, CALLING A TRUCE TO TERROR 122 (1979).
144. U.S. Supports Attack, Jordan and Egypt Vow to Press for Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
2, 1985, at A1. U.S. Ambassador Walters nevertheless supported the Israeli justification 
for the attack in spite of the abstention:
My Government could not support the draft resolution disproportionately 
placing all blame for this latest round of the rising spiral of violence in the 
Middle East onto only one set of shoulders, while not also holding at fault those 
responsible for the terrorist acts which provoked it . . . . We speak of a pattern 
of violence, but we must be clear: it is terrorism that is the cause of this pattern, 
not responses to terrorist attacks . . . . [W]e recognize and strongly support the 
principle that a state subjected to continuing terrorist attacks may respond with 
appropriate use of force to defend itself against further attacks. This is an aspect 
of the inherent right of self-defence recognized in the United Nations Charter. 
We support this principle regardless of attacker, and regardless of victim.
U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2615th mtg. at 46, U.N. Doc S/PV.2615 (Oct. 4, 1985).
145. The Israeli attack by six F-15 fighter-bombers apparently left 70 men, women and 
children dead and more than 100 Tunisians and Palestinians wounded. See Donald R. 
Morris, Cycle of Terrorism Will Continue with Retaliatory Strikes, HOUS. POST, Jan. 2, 
1986, at 2B.
146. Israel Calls Bombing a Warning to Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1985, at A8.
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condemn the act as a flagrant violation of the UN Charter, international 
law, and norms of conduct.147 Three days after the attack, a single session 
of the Security Council produced Resolution 573 (with only one 
abstention by the United States), which condemned the Israeli attack; 
demanded that Israel “refrain from perpetrating such acts of aggression 
or from threatening to do so;” urged member states to “dissuade Israel 
from resorting to such acts;” and supported Tunisia’s right to 
reparations.148
The international community in general condemned the Israeli Tunis
raid as an act of aggression and a violation of Tunisia’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity.149 Israel’s argument of self-defence against terrorism
was dismissed.150 Israel’s attack and the U.S.’s subsequent support in the 
face of vitriolic condemnation by most countries was symptomatic of the 
revolution in policy that the United States was undertaking. The United 
States abstained from the string of condemnations that followed every 
Israeli action debated in the Security Council, and began to veto 
consideration of those resolutions, effectively ending discussion of the 
matter within the Security Council.151 This change in U.S. reaction was 
not just the result of a new, hawkish conservative administration; it was 
also a response to the targeting of U.S. citizens and interests by state-
sponsored terrorists. U.S. Ambassador Vernon Walter’s explanation of 
the U.S. abstention in the Security Council Resolution condemning 
Israel’s bombing in Tunis is instructive:
147. A Resolution condemning the attacks was swiftly passed with a vote of fourteen 
votes to none, with the United States abstaining. S.C. Res. 573, U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 
(Oct. 4, 1985).
148. Id.
149. See Marian Nash Leich, U.S. Practice, 80 A.J.I.L 151, 165–67 (1986) (discussing 
resort to war and armed force).
150. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2615, supra note 144. See, e.g., remarks made by Ambassadors 
Ononaiye, Golob, Kusumaatmadja, Chamorro Mora, Wasiuddin, Shihabi, Zarif, and Le 
Kim Chung. Id.
151. The United States did not cast its first veto in favor of Israel until 1972. From 
1967–72, the U.S. supported or abstained on 24 resolutions, most critical of Israel. From 
1973–2003, the Security Council adopted approximately 100 resolutions on the Middle 
East, again, most critical of Israel with the U.S. vetoing a total of 37 resolutions. Mitchell 
Geoffrey Bard, Myths & Facts Online: The United Nations available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/myths/mf13.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2006). 
For a detailed and comprehensive analysis of voting patterns in the Security Council on 
resolutions affecting and/or involving Israel, see MITCHELL GEOFFREY BARD, ET AL, 
MYTHS AND FACTS: A CONCISE RECORD OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT (1992); HARRIS 
SCHOENBERG, MANDATE FOR TERROR: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE  PLO (1989).
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We . . . recognize and strongly support the principle that a state 
subjected to continuing terrorist attacks may respond with appropriate 
use of force to defend against further attacks. This is an aspect of the 
inherent right of self-defense recognized in the United Nations 
Charter.152Two months after the Israeli counter-terrorist attacks, the U.S. 
frustration with the international regime on the use of force in countering 
terrorism was captured clearly by Secretary of State Shultz’s outburst:
It is absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from capturing 
terrorists in international waters or airspace; from attacking them on the 
soil of other nations, even for the purpose of rescuing hostages; or from 
using force against states that support, train, and harbor terrorists or 
guerrillas. International law requires no such result.153
With these words, Shultz laid down more building blocks for the 
“Shultz Doctrine” and its highly controversial position advocating the 
use of military force not only against terrorists, but also against states 
that support, train, or harbor terrorists.154 This Doctrine was formally 
fleshed out on January 15, 1986, in the Secretary’s speech on terrorism at 
the National Defense University.155 In that speech, the Secretary added: 
“a nation attacked by terrorists is permitted to use force to prevent or pre-
empt future attacks, to seize terrorists, or to rescue its citizens, when no 
other means is available.”156 This is so, the Secretary said, even though 
others have “asserted that military action to retaliate or pre-empt 
terrorism is contrary to international law.”157
Worldwide opposition to the new policy was swift in coming. 
Surpris ingly, even some senior officials in the U.S. State Department 
expressed reservations.158 U.S. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, 
in charge of the machinery that would be tasked with affecting the 
doctrine, opposed responsive military strikes that needlessly “kill women 
152. Press Release No. 106, Vernon Walters, U.S. Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations (Oct. 4, 1985), extract reprinted in 80 A.J.I.L. 166, 166–67.
153. George Shultz, U.S. Sec’y of State, Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of 
Ambiguity, Address Before the Low-Intensity Warfare Conference (Jan. 15, 1986), in 25 
INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 204, 206 (1986). Bernard Gwertzman, Shultz Supports Armed 
Reprisals, N.Y. TIMES,  Jan. 16, 1986, at A1.
154. See Don Oberdorfer, Abraham Sofaer; State’s Legal Adviser Deals with Policy, 
Then the Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1986, at A13.
155. Gwertzman, Shultz Supports Armed Reprisals, supra note 153.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Bernard Gwertzman, Shultz and Weinberger Disagree on Using Force 
Against Libyans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1986, at A1. 
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and children.”159 Additionally, Robert Oakley, Ambassador-at-Large for 
Counter Terrorism, opined that the President’s Commission on Terrorism 
had recommended that the United States not use military force to 
retaliate against states supporting terrorists.160 International and domestic 
opposition in the United States was a result of a number of difficult 
issues raised by the doctrine, and the difficult questions raised by the 
U.S.’s new policy:
[I]s the responding coercion still a use of force in self-defense against 
an armed “attack?” Is the responding coercion primarily pre-emptive, 
retaliatory, or for the purpose of imposing sanctions against a violation 
of international law? And if among the latter, are any of these forms of 
responsive coercion ever permissible?161
The United States was determined not to back down, and a few weeks 
after Shultz had fleshed out his doctrine, the Vice President’s Task Force 
on Combating Terrorism found: “[t]errorism has become another means 
of conducting foreign affairs. Such terrorists are agents whose 
association the state can easily deny. Use of terrorism by the country 
entails few risks, and constitutes strong-arm, low-budget foreign 
policy.”162 This statement echoed the Reagan administration’s concerns 
over new and unconventional challenges to U.S. foreign policy in critical 
areas of the world.
Though it was evident that this threat of low-intensity conflict raised a 
host of new legal, political, military, and moral issues, it was not long 
before the U.S. demonstrated that it was not overly concerned with the 
questions that its new policy engendered and that the “Reagan” and 
“Shultz Doctrines” were not just hollow rhetoric. On April 5, 1986, Le 
Belle discotheque in West Germany, a spot popular with off-duty 
American servicemen, was bombed, leaving two Americans dead and 
over 154 persons injured.163 U.S. intelligence indicated Libya sponsored 
this terrorist attack.164 President Reagan responded to this threat by 
bombing military targets in Tripoli and Benghazi, Libya on April 14, 
159. See Task Force Supports U.S. Policy on Global Terrorism, Official Says, HOUS. 
POST, Mar. 2, 1986, at 13A.
160. See id.
161. Jordan J. Paust, Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism: The Use of 
Force Abroad, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 711, 716 (1986).
162. Public Report of the Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, Feb. 
1986 at 2, available at http://www.population-security.org/bush_and_terror.pdf.
163. 2d U.S. Soldier Dies from Bombing of Disco, CHI. TRIB., June 8, 1986, at C8.
164. U.S. Exercises Right of Self–Defence Against Libyan Terrorism, 86 DEP’T ST. 
BULL. 1, 8 (June 1986).
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1986.165 The attack was met with condemnation.166 Critics claimed the 
time lapse and proportionally of the attacks, as well as the choice of 
targets undermined the primary justification of self-defence.167 As Major 
Phillip A. Seymour notes:
Although President Reagan cited self-defense under Article 51 of the 
UN Charter as the legal basis for the air strike, his explanation 
implicitly included retaliation (i.e., reprisal) as an additional 
justification . . . . In deciding to use military force against Libya, 
deterrence certainly was a major, if not the primary, consideration . . . . 
This interpretation is supported by then-Vice President George Bush’s 
comments a month prior to the Libyan raid when he stated that 
American policy in combating terrorism would be one of a willingness 
to “retaliate.”168
The Tripoli bombing was far from a one off event; it was part of a 
crystallizing U.S. policy. This was despite the fact that international law 
relating to self-defence did not accord with the American viewpoint. The 
United States seemed determined to co-opt the use of military force 
against terrorism within the infirm concept of anticipatory self-defence.
Two years later after the air raid on Tripoli, on December 21, 1988, 
while cruising at an altitude of 31,000 feet, Pan American Flight 103 
(“Flight 103”) exploded in the skies over Lockerbie, Scotland.169 Two 
hundred fifty-eight passengers and crew died in the explosion; another 
seventeen townspeople died on the ground as a result of the fiery 
debris.170 President Reagan ordered an inquiry into the circumstances of 
the Flight 103 disaster and directed the preparation of a report intended 
to be “a comprehensive study and appraisal of practices and policy 
165. Bernard Weintraub, U.S. Calls Libya Raid a Success; “Choice is Theirs,” Reagan 
Says; Moscow Cancels Scultz Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1986, at A1.
166. See William F. Buckley, Libya: Reactions, NAT’L REV., May 23, 1986, at 54; 
George J. Church, U.S. Bombers Strike at Libya’s Author of Terrorism, Dividing 
Eurpowe and Threateneing a Rash of Retaliations, TIME, Apr. 28, 1986, at 16; Steve 
Holland, West Talked Tough, but Terrorists Weren’t Listening; Attacks in 1986 Took a 
Bloody Toll Despite Threats and Raid on Libya, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Cal.), 
Dec.17, 1986, at 2A; William V. Shannon, Thatcher’s Reservations, BOSTON GLOBE,  
June 10, 1987, at A21. See also Sir John Thompson, U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2679th mtg., 
at 27, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2679 (1986) (Prime Minister Thatcher primarily concerned with 
proportionality).
167. See Kelly, supra note 87, at 17.
168. Seymour, supra note 103, at 223.
169. Russell Watson, An Explosion in the Sky, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 2, 1989, at 16.
170. Id. at 17.
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options with respect to preventing terrorist acts involving aviation.”171
Among the recommendations of the President’s Commission were 
“active measures—pre-emptive or retaliatory, direct or covert—against a 
series of targets in countries well-known to have engaged in state-
sponsored terrorism.”172 These recommendations reinforced the vitality 
of the “Reagan” and “Shultz Doctrines” as part of the U.S. policy of pre-
emption. It was, however, not until the end of the Cold War that the 
United States had the opportunity to fully pursue this new national 
policy.
IV. POST-COLD WAR: PROACTIVE ACTION TO COUNTER TERRORISM
In 1993, following the discovery of an Iraqi plot to assassinate then 
U.S. President George Bush Sr. on a visit to Kuwait, the United States 
fired twenty-three cruise missiles at Iraqi intelligence targets within 
Iraq.173 Though the attack came after those involved in the plot in Kuwait 
had been apprehended and then President Bush had completed his 
planned visit, the justification presented to Congress by the President 
was that the action was within the right of self-defence under Article 
51.174
The next significant case of American action to counter terrorism 
through military action came on August 7, 1998 when U.S. Embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania were bombed, killing at least 252 (including 12 U.S. 
citizens) and injuring more than 5,000. Secretary of State Albright 
pledged to “use all means at our disposal to track down and punish”
those responsible.175 On August 20, 1998, the United States responded by 
launching seventy-nine Tomahawk cruise missiles from U.S. warships.176
This attack was directed at an Osama bin Laden bankrolled Al Qaeda 
terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and a Sudanese pharmaceutical 
171. Exec. Order No. 32,629, 54 Fed. Reg. 12,686 (Aug. 4, 1989).
172. Report of the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism 125 
(May 25, 1990).
173. Jack M. Beard, Military Action against Terrorists Under International Law: 
America’s New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense under International Law, 25 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 561 (2002).
174. Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters, 
1 PUB. PAPERS 940 (June 28, 1993), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubapers/.
175. Raphael F. Perl, Terrorism: U.S. Response to Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania: 
A New Policy Direction? CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS, Sept. 1, 1998, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB55/crs19980901.pdf (last visited 
January 30, 2005).
176. W. Michael Reisman, Legal Responses to International Terrorism, 22 HOUS. J. 
INT’L L. 3, 47 (1999).
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plant177 that the Clinton Administration suspected was producing 
chemical weapons components with bin Laden’s funding.178
The American justification for their military action was based on both 
reprisal and anticipatory self-defence.179 In his address to the nation, then 
U.S. President Bill Clinton told the American people that the strikes 
against the “terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan” were 
necessary because of the “imminent threat they presented to [U.S.] 
national security.”180 Thus the Clinton Administration, like the Reagan 
Administration before it, justified its response to terrorist strikes by 
claiming self-defence. In a report sent to Congress, then President 
Clinton claimed that the strikes were justified under the “inherent right of 
self-defense consistent with Article 51 . . .” and at the same time were 
intended to “prevent and deter additional attacks . . . .”181 Moreover, 
177. Many critics later raised doubts about the quality of the evidence relied upon by 
the Clinton Administration in its decision to strike the Sudanese pharmaceutical plant. 
For a discussion of such doubts, see Sara N. Scheideman, Standards of Proof in Forcible 
Responses to Terrorism,  50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 249, 257–60 (2000).
178. See Maureen F. Brennan, Avoiding Anarchy: Bin Laden Terrorism, the U.S. 
Response, and the Role of Customary International Law, 59 LA. L. REV. 1195 (1999). It 
should be noted that Clinton’s reasons for striking Afghanistan and Sudan (in an effort to 
reach bin Laden) are analogous to Reagan’s reasons for attacking Libya (in an effort to 
reach Qadhafi). See O’Brien, supra note 76, at 463–65 (suggesting that the Reagan 
administration attacked Libya in 1986 as a reprisal for Qadhafi’s suspected support of 
terrorist attacks on U.S. targets).  As Brennan explains:
[Though a]dmitting that the bin Laden terrorist “network” was not sponsored 
by any state, Clinton outlined four reasons for the action: 1) overwhelming 
evidence showed bin Laden “played the key role in the embassy bombings”; 2) 
his network had been responsible for past terrorist attacks against Americans; 
3) officials had “compelling information” that bin Laden was planning future 
attacks and 4) his organization was attempting to obtain chemical weapons. In a 
second statement, President Clinton carefully characterized the strikes as 
necessary to defend against the threat of “imminent” and “immediate” future 
attacks, and not as retribution or punishment.
See Brennan, supra at 1195– 96.
179. Remarks in Martha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts, on Military Action Against 
Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1460 (Aug. 20, 1998), available 
at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/.
180. Address to the Nation on Military Action against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan 
and Sudan, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1460 (Aug. 20, 1998), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
pubpapers/.
181. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Military Action against Terrorist 
Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1460 (Aug. 21, 1998), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/.
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President Clinton invoked the traditional Caroline requirements of 
imminence, necessity, and proportionality, claiming that all three had 
been met.182 Indeed, when Bill Richardson, then U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations, wrote the letter notifying the UN Security Council of the 
U.S. missile attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan, he clearly laid out the 
U.S. arguments in support of the attacks in the familiar language of self-
defence.183 Clinton’s Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen, went 
further by warning terrorist organizations that the United States would 
not limit itself to “passive defense” when faced with choosing either to 
“fight or fold in pathetic cowardice . . . . ”184
Many of the same critiques of the Reagan Administration’s bombing of 
Libya in 1986 were lodged at the Clinton Administration’s cruise missile 
attacks in Afghanistan and Sudan, and many observers concluded that 
the cruise missile attacks violated the rules of international law.185
Indeed, one commentator suggested that the Clinton Administration 
foresaw this criticism: “The care with which . . . President [Clinton] and 
U.S. officials characterized the justification for the missile attacks 
182. See id. at 1464.
183. Ambassador Richardson’s letter to the President of the UN Security Council, 
dated  August 20, 1998, stated in part:
These attacks were carried out only after repeated efforts to convince the 
Government of Sudan and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to shut these 
terrorist activities down and to cease their cooperation with the bin laden 
organization. That organization has issued a series of blatant warnings that 
‘strikes will continue from everywhere’ against American targets, and we have 
convincing evidence that further such attacks were in preparation from these 
same terrorist facilities. The United States, therefore, had no choice but to use 
armed force to prevent these attacks from continuing. In doing so, the United 
States has acted pursuant to the right of self-defence confirmed by Article 51 of 
the Charter of the United Nations. The targets struck, and the timing and 
method of attack used, were carefully designed to minimize risks of collateral 
damage to civilians and to comply with international law, including the rules of 
necessity and proportionality.
Reisman, supra note 176, at 48–49 (quoting Letter from Bill Richardson, the Permanent 
Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the 
President of the Security Council of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. S/1998/780 (Aug. 20, 
1998)).
184. Scheideman, supra note 177, at 250.
185. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The 
Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 537, 557 (1999) (“the August 20 
missile strikes represent the assertion of imperial might and arrogance [by the United 
States] in opposition to international law”).
36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 31:2
show[ed] their concern that the actions of the United States could be 
perceived as a violation of international law.”186
In characterizing the cruise missile strikes as “retaliation rather than 
legitimate self-defense,”187 critics took issue with the fact that the targets 
of the attacks in both Afghanistan and Sudan had no direct link to any 
“imminent” attack against the United States.188 Furthermore, it was 
unlikely that the destruction of the terrorist training camps in 
Afghanistan, and the leveling of the pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, met 
the proportionality requirement regulating uses of force in self-
defence.189 Thus, no matter how the Clinton Administration chose to 
justify the attacks—whether as retaliation or as self-defence—the 
equation simply did not add up to an acceptable use of force under 
international law.190 Most notably,
this is the first time the U.S. has given such primary and public 
prominence to the preemptive, not just retaliatory, nature and motive of 
a military strike against a terrorist organization or network. This may 
be signaling a more proactive and global counter-terrorism policy, less 
constrained in targeting terrorists, their bases, or infrastructure.191
In a warning to terrorist groups who may seek weapons of mass 
destruction, President Clinton cited past efforts by the Al Qaeda terrorist 
network to acquire chemical and other dangerous weapons as one of the 
reasons for the U.S. attack. The Clinton Administration had not only 
declared war on terror, but had also laid down the framework which the 
George W. Bush Administration would take to the next level in the 
aftermath of the September 11th attacks.
A. September 11, 2001: Crossing the Rubicon?
In a coordinated operation, whose breadth and audacity stunned the 
world, terrorists believed to be part of the Al Qaeda network carried out 
the worst terrorist attack in modern times, targeting various symbols of 
186. See Brennan, supra note 178, at 1197.
187. Id. at 1210.
188. Id. at 1209–10.
189. See Leah M. Campbell, Defending Against Terrorism: A Legal Analysis of the 
Decision to Strike Sudan and Afghanistan 74 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1095 (2000).
190. Id. at 1096. (“If the purpose of the strikes was retaliatory, it contravened 
conventional international law. If the strikes were motivated by self-defence, it appears 
that the necessary elements [an armed attack, necessity, immediacy, and proportionality] 
were not present.”).
191. Perl, supra note 175. 
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U.S. supremacy and leaving over 3,000 people dead.192 The day after the 
attacks, the UN Security Council tersely stated that “[t]he magnitude of 
[the] acts goes beyond terrorism as we have known it so far . . . . We 
therefore think that new definitions, terms and strategies have to be 
developed for the new realities.”193 On the same day, the UN General 
Assembly, at its first plenary meeting of the year, adopted Resolution 
56/1 without a vote, urgently calling for international cooperation to 
prevent and eradicate acts of terrorism and stressing that those 
responsible for aiding, supporting, or harboring the perpetrators, 
organizers, and sponsors of such acts would be held accountable.194
Nine days later, on September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush 
pledged: “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end 
there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been 
found, stopped, and defeated.”195 The UN Security Council agreed with 
President Bush on the urgent need to fight terrorism.196 In addition, every 
major regional organization, including the Arab League, agreed that the 
September 11th hijackings and attacks on the World Trade Center and 
Penta gon were acts of terrorism in violation of international law.197
192. Four commercial aircraft were hijacked, two of them were flown into the twin 
towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, causing both buildings to collapse. 
A third aircraft crashed into the Pentagon building in Arlington, Virginia, which houses 
the headquarters of the U.S. Department of Defence and the U.S. armed forces. The 
fourth aircraft crashed near Somerset, Pennsylvania. See RAPHAEL PERL, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS: TERRORISM, THE FUTURE, AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY 1, 3 (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports 
(order code IB95112).
193. Valeriy Kuchinsky, Ukrainian Representative to the United Nations Security 
Council, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg. at 3–4, U.N.  Doc. S/PV.4370 (2001).
194. G.A. Res. 56/1, ¶ 4, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/56/49 
(Sept. 12, 2001).
195. Address to a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the 
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140, 1141 (Sept. 20, 2001), available 
at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/ [hereinafter Response].
196. S.C. Res. 1368, ¶ 4, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
197. The UN General Assembly condemned the attacks as illegal and criminal acts of 
terrorism. G.A. Res. 56/160, ¶ 3, U.N. GOAR, 56th Sess., 88th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 
119b, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/160 (Dec. 19, 2001). The Security Council condemned the 
attacks “as a threat to international peace and security.” S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 196. 
The Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, Organization of American 
States, Association of South East Asian Nations, Organization of African Unity, and 
Arab League also agreed that the hijacking of American passenger airliners by al Qaeda 
terrorists was criminal. See e.g., Colin Powell, A Long, Hard Campaign, NEWSWEEK, 
Oct. 15, 2001, at 53.
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UN Security Resolution 1368, passed a day after the September 11th
attacks, unequivocally condemned the attacks, calling on all states to 
“work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers 
and sponsors”198 of the attacks, and thus reaffirmed the inherent right of 
self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.199 The 
U.S. right of self-defence was often mentioned in the same breath as the 
terrorist attacks. “Given the circumstances, this affirmation was 
significant: it implied that the attacks triggered the right even if, at the 
time of adoption, the UN Security Council knew almost nothing about 
who or what had launched them.”200
The shift in the law of pre-emption was evident. The international 
response to retaliatory military strikes made by Israel against Tunisia in 
1985 had been strongly condemnatory, despite Israel’s argument that 
Tunisia’ s acts of harboring, supplying, and assisting non-state actors who 
they claimed committed terrorist acts in Israel should be sufficient to 
attribute the acts to the state.201 Notwithstanding Israel’s claims of self-
defence, in Resolution 573 the Security Council condemned the 1985 air 
attack on PLO headquarters as an “act of armed aggression . . . in 
flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, international law 
and norms of conduct.”202 The fact that Resolution 573 condemned 
Israel’s attack as contrary to the UN Charter implied that no justification 
based on self-defence was recognized. Subsequently, the claim of self-
defence was also rejected by states as justification for the U.S. bombing 
of Tripoli and the 1993 bombing of the Iraqi Secret Service.203 The 
inter national response to the September 11th attack was an important 
departure from the reasoning in Resolution 573.
Amidst a swell of international support, the United States quickly 
identified the Al Qaeda terrorist network, with the support of the Taliban 
198. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 196, at ¶ 3.
199. Id. at preamble.
200. Nicholas Rostow, Before and After: The Changed UN Response to Terrorism 
since September 11th, 35 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 475, 481 (2001).
201. Admittedly, the situation differs in exact factual circumstances from the
September 11th attacks, but does reflect the general stance of the international 
community prior to that event. The Security Council was obviously faced with a situation 
that profoundly differs from the previous incidents where there were limited casualties.
202. S.C. Res. 573 U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 (Oct. 4, 1985). See generally Marian Nash 
Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 80 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 151, 165–67 (1986) (discussing the UN Security Council’s condemnation of 
Israel’s air attack).
203. Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law after 11 
September, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 401, 407 (2002).
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government, as the perpetrators of the September 11th attacks.204 This 
was coupled with the recognition that the modern threat to U.S. power 
and security rises not from one particular organization, but from the 
growing threat of international terrorism, particularly terrorism that 
enjoys active or tacit state support.205 The Security Council’s resolutions 
following the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan explicitly mention the right of 
individual and collective self-defence and do not contain any 
condemnation of the military strikes.206
“Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan signaled a renewed 
determination on the part of the United States to combat international 
terrorism and states that sponsor it; the operation laid fertile ground for 
debate on the strategic or legal approach that states should adopt in 
responding to such threats. Strategically, the U.S. military action was 
based on the “Reagan Doctrine” of swift and effective retribution against 
terrorist organizations that strike U.S. interests,207 as well as the “Shultz 
Doctrine” of active military engagement of terrorists and states that 
sponsor or support them. Though legally, the U.S. justified “Operation 
Enduring Freedom” under the established doctrine of self-defence,208 talk 
from Washington suggested pre-emptive self-defence.
Essentially, the United States did not consider military action against 
Afghanistan as a formal war against the state but pre-emption of further 
attacks by terrorists based in that state. As the United States moved 
against Afghanistan, the highest levels of military, legal, and diplomatic 
policymakers in Washington began debating how the country should 
confront states that sponsor terrorism and proliferate weapons of mass 
destruction. The immediate focus of the debate was U.S. policy towards 
204. See Response, supra note 195, at 1140 (“The evidence we have gathered all 
points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as Al Qaeda.”).
205. The war on terror “will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has 
been found, stopped, and defeated . . . . From this day forward, any nation that continues 
to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” 
Response, supra note 195, at 1141–42.
206. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1390, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4452nd mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1390 (2002); S.C. Res. 1401, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4501st mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1401 (2002).
207. See Crelinsten & Schmid, supra note 15, at 307, 316. The policy described by 
Crelinsten and Schmid has clearly been continued by Reagan’s successors. This is 
evident in Clinton’s air strikes against Iraq for the attempted assassination of George 
H.W. Bush and his strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan following the embassy 
bombings in Tanzania and Kenya.
208. For a discussion of the international legal validity of U.S. military action 
“Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan, see Beard, supra note 173, at 559.
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Iraq. Soon after the military action in Afghanistan, President Bush 
provoked heated reaction with his “Axis of Evil” speech209 and its strong 
overtones of the use of unilateral military action by the United States 
against countries that support terror, and an intimation of expanding the 
theatre of operations beyond Afghanistan without Security Council 
approval. 210
B. The “ Bush Doctrine”
Though the genesis of the “Bush Doctrine” can be traced to the 
immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks,211 it was five months 
after the “Axis of Evil” speech, on June 1, 2001, that President Bush 
delivered the fullest exposition of the doctrine in a speech at West 
Point.212 Warning that the United States faced “a threat with no 
precedent” through the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
the emergence of global terrorism, President Bush stated that the 
traditional strategies of deterrence and containment were no longer 
sufficient.213 Because of the new threats that the United States faced, he 
claimed that a proper understanding of the right of self-defence would
now extend to authorizing pre-emptive attacks against potential 
aggressors, cutting them off before they are able to launch devastating 
strikes.214 Under these circumstances, he concluded that “[i]f we wait for 
threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.”215 Expounding 
on the strategic aspect of the doctrine, President Bush stated that there 
was a need to “take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and 
confront the worst threats before they emerge.”216 In the same address, he 
went on to tell future U.S. military officers at West Point that “[t]he 
military must be ready to strike at a moment’s notice in any dark corner 
of the world. All nations that decide for aggression and terror will pay a 
price.”217 That doctrine carried an explicit warning for Iraq and other 
209. George W. Bush, President of the United States, 2002 State of the Union Address 
(Jan. 29, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.
210. See id.
211. Nine days after the attacks, U.S. President George Bush announced the new 
aggressive national policy towards terrorism. See Response, supra note 195, at 1141–42.
212. See West Point Commencement Address, supra note 16.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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states that pursue weapons of mass destruction: if a hostile regime 
pursues the acquisition or development of chemical, biological, or 
nuclear weapons, the decisive use of pre-emptive military force is a 
legitimate response.
President Bush spent months building the case for war against Iraq, 
however his justifications were often confusing and long on rhetoric but 
short on substance. His primary argument, however, invoked a sweeping 
new foreign policy based on the right of the U.S. to pre-emptive self-
defence, the need to punish Iraq for not complying with the Security 
Council resolutions to which it had agreed in exchange for an end to the 
Gulf War, and the need for massive retaliation.218 President Bush seemed 
unsure of the exact contours of his doctrine, tying up pre-emptive strikes 
with retaliation (which the author avers falls under the rubric of peace 
time reprisal).
Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—
means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or 
citizen to defend . . . . Containment is not possible when unbalanced 
dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons 
or missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies . . . . If we wait for 
threats to fully materialize, we will have waited for too long . . . . In the 
world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. 
And this nation will act.219
Though the more modest argument of retaliation may have been the 
strongest, the U.S. response was increasingly articulated more firmly in 
favor of anticipatory self-defence. The National Security Strategy 
document, issued by President Bush in September 2002, asserted:
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer 
an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves 
against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal 
scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of 
pre-emption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a 
visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack
. . . . 
218. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Address to the United 
Nations General Assembly (Sept. 12, 2002) (transcript available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/relases/2002/09/print/20020912-1.html); President 
George W. Bush, Press Conference of the President (Apr. 123, 2004) (transcript available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/relases/2004/04/print/40040413-20.html).
219. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 16, at 15 (emphasis added).
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The U.S. has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to 
counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the 
threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the 
case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if 
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To 
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the U.S. will, if 
necessary, act pre-emptively.220
The National Security Strategy document referred to the longstanding 
policy as an option, not a principle.221 Interestingly though, the UN
Charter, the centre point of the legal framework on the international use 
of force, was not mentioned, and no attempt was made to anchor the 
formal articulation of the option within the umbrella of the Charter.
Despite the United States’ maneuverings while formulating a post-
September 11th security strategy, it had Iraq firmly in its sights. The 
United States and its allies continued to put forward what even then was 
regarded by many as faulty intelligence,222 in an attempt to link Iraq to 
the September 11th attacks.223 Before the war, despite international and 
220. See id.
221. Id. at 15.
222. Dana Priest, U.S. Not Claiming Iraqi Link to Terror, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2002, 
at A1 (reporting that CIA analysts are unable to validate allegations that the Iraqi 
gov ernment has ties to Al Qaeda); Walter Pincus, No Link Between Hijacker, Iraq Found, 
U.S. Says, WASH. POST, May 1, 2002, at A9; KENNETH M. POLLACK, THE THREATENING 
STORM: THE CASE FOR INVADING IRAQ xxi–xxiii (2002); see also JOHN KAMPFNER, 
BLAIR’S WARS (2003); No 10 Denies Straw Had War Doubts, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 
15, 2003, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,1042511,00.html; Matthew Tempest, 
Hoon Regrets “Misunderstanding,” GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 11, 2003, available at
http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12956,1039958,00.html (alleging that 
documents used to bolster the United States’ claims that Iraq presented a nuclear threat 
were crudely-forged documents relating to Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Niger).
223. Secretary of State Colin Powell admitted that he was unaware of any “smoking 
gun” linking Iraq to the September 11th attacks. Notwithstanding Powell’s admission, 
President Bush and other senior U.S. government officials continued to rally around 
questionable intelligence. They sheepishly admitted months later, after the war in Iraq 
was officially over, what most states suspected all along—there was no link between Iraq 
and the September 11th attacks. Bill Keller, The World According to Colin Powell, N. Y. 
TIMES MAG. Nov. 25, 2001, at 61. On September 17, 2003, President Bush stated that 
there was no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved in the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, disputing an idea held by many Americans. This came a day after 
his hawkish Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, said he had not seen any evidence that 
Saddam was involved in the attacks. The National Security Adviser came out in support 
of the Bush and Rumsfeld sentiments, saying “[w]e have never claimed that Saddam 
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domestic skepticism, the hawkish Bush Administration had already 
decided that the tragic events of September 11th had altered the context 
of the United States-Iraq confrontation.224 The resulting U.S. shift to an 
aggressive Iraq policy forced it to advance rather dubious legal 
justifications for a full-scale invasion. Relying on the multifaceted “Bush 
Doctrine,” the policy advocates pre-emptive or preventive strikes against 
terrorists, states that support terrorists, and hostile states possessing 
weapons of mass destruction.
The U.S.’s new aggressive anti-terror campaign began with 
multilateral condemnation of terrorism. The United States and the United 
Kingdom successfully encouraged the UN Security Council to pass 
Resolution 1441,225 which gave Iraq a final opportunity to comply with 
its disarmament obligations through weapons inspections. Impatient with
the slow pace of the UN weapon’s inspection process, the United States 
soon assumed evidence of Iraqi involvement with terrorist activity and 
that Iraqi capacity for weapons of mass destruction persisted.226
The U.S. national security officials were adamant in their commitment 
to act fast and to act alone and increasingly balked at UN control over the 
use of force against rogue states that present perceived security threats.227
The end-game of this debate was cemented by President Bush when he 
announced that “the policy of [the U.S.] government is the removal of 
Saddam [Hussein].”228 This announcement effectively cut off all future 
multilateral activities with the UN.
Possibly, in light of the dubious intelligence linking Iraq to the 
Septe mber 11th attacks, the United States cited Iraq’s capacity to use 
Hussein had either direction or control of 9/11.” Greg Miller, No Proof Connects Iraq to 
911, Bush Says, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2003, available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/justify/2003/0918proof.htm.
224. POLLACK, supra note 222, at xxi–xxiii.
225. S.C. Res. 1441, 1, 13, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002). The UN Security 
Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441. The resolution declares Iraq to be in 
material breach of its obligations under past UN mandates. It also informs Iraq it will face 
“serious consequences” if it fails to cooperate. It is questionable whether it authorises a 
member-state to unilaterally take action in the event of further non-compliance.
226. Much debate abounds about the credibility of the U.S. evidence regarding Iraq’s 
links to Al Qaeda. The issue of the possession of weapons of mass destruction, the 
quantity and nature is yet another controversy. Admittedly, it is difficult to conclude one 
way or the other but what stands out is the fact that the international community remained 
divided over the matter right up to the day of military action.
227. See generally NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 16.
228. Allies Discuss Terrorism and the Middle East: Bush and Blair on Policy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at A14.
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weapons of mass destruction as an additional justification for self-
defensive anticipatory intervention against Iraq.229 Self-defence, it was 
suggested, also fueled the need for internal “regime change” in Iraq and 
U.S. support of such change.230 In March 2003, without waiting for the 
UN Security Council to declare Iraq in breach of Resolution 1441 and, 
thus, a threat to international peace and security for which the Council 
could explicitly authorize military intervention,231 the United States and 
its allies proceeded with military action against Iraq premised on pre-
emptive or anticipatory self-defence. The technologically superior U.S. 
army waged a highly-organized, technical “shock and awe” campaign 
that impressed an otherwise angry international community, and drove 
Saddam Hussein out of power.232 The war against Iraq was to be the 
defining moment in the evolution of the “Bush Doctrine,” marking a 
growing coherence and confidence in the strategy of “offensive defense.”
Despite the United States’ focus on pre-emptive intervention, the 
action against Iraq and the United States’ subsequent occupation was 
undertaken against a background of vehement opposition from a large 
section of the international community, including some major powers.233
If Afghanistan had set the stage for the evolution of anticipatory self-
defence, the over breadth of the U.S. action in Iraq action dismantled it.
The regime on force does not support the operationalisation of pre-
emptive self-defence against Iraq as it did in Afghanistan, and the 
circumstances surrounding U.S. intervention in Iraq differ fundamentally 
from those in Afghanistan. The United States did not conclusively prove 
229. Traditionally, anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defence has not been favoured 
under international law. See Byers, supra note 203, at 410. However, the notion of pre-
emptive “counter-proliferation” forms an important part of the new U.S. national security 
strategy. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 16.
230. The United States affirmed it would provide “‘lethal assistance’ in the form of 
military training and arms to Iraqi opposition volunteers and Kurdish fighters in Iraq.”  
Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. and Britain Drafting Resolution to Impose Deadline on Iraq, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002, at A14; Julia Preston & Eric Schmitt, Threats and Responses: The 
UN Diplomacy; U.S.-French Split on Iraq Deepens, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2002, at A1 
(reporting that the CIA had begun covert operations in the Kurdish area of northern Iraq 
with a view to fomenting an uprising in Iraq).
231. See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42. A plain reading of Resolution 1441, suggests that 
there would be another UN Security Council meeting in the event of an Iraqi breach, at 
least to discuss the inspectors’ report, at which point the use of force could be authorised. 
On the other hand, the use of fuzzy and ambiguous language could be read as supporting 
the notion that the Security Council is allowing individual states greater interpretive 
latitude in deciding when force can be used.
232. Maogoto, Rushing to Break the Law, supra note 31, at 17.
233. Id. at 11.
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that Al Qaeda maintained Iraqi training bases or that it received financial, 
logistic, or military support from the Iraqi government.234 The strategic 
and legal calculus for action in Iraq did not compare favorably to that 
which motivated U.S. action in Afghanistan in late 2001. Unlike the 
questionable connection between Iraq and the September 11th attacks,
there were clear ties between the terrorists involved in the U.S. attacks 
and the government of Afghanistan.235
Not surprisingly, military action against Iraq has split the international 
community and inflamed the world’s major powers, as it raises both 
policy and legal matters. Considering that the use of armed force can 
only be justified under the international law regime when used in self-
defence, can the United States go beyond the rhetoric and actually carry
the war on terror to those rogue nations who are identified as supporters 
and sponsors of terrorist activities, but have not physically engaged in an 
act of aggression against the United States?236 The convergence of 
international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction presents a grave 
threat to international peace, security, and prosperity by threatening the 
survival of entire nations. This threat multiplies exponentially when 
gov ernments foster and encourage these dual scourges. However, the 
aggressive “Bush Doctrine” is disturbing because an old problem in 
contemporary international law (anticipatory self-defence) is being 
touted as a newly appropriate vehicle in the war against international 
terrorism, despite the prevailing view in the international community that 
the “armed attack” requirement in Article 51 of the UN Charter 
superseded any pre-existing right of anticipatory action.
The old truism that “international law is not a suicide pact,” may be 
forceful in “an age of uniquely destructive weaponry,”237 however, 
“stra tegically, there is little precedent for a major U.S. military offensive 
against a state that has not proximately used force against [the United 
States].”238 While a number of legitimate justifications might permit the 
use of force, the international legal system does not currently provide a 
legal outlet for such force.239 “An international law doctrine, under which 
234. Id. at 9.
235. Id. at 11.
236. See generally Jeffrey F. Addicott, Legal and Policy Implications for a New Era: 
The “War on Terror,” 4 S CHOLAR 209 (2001-02).
237. Louis R. Beres, The Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination During 
Peace and War, 5 TEMP. INT’L  & COMP. L.J. 231, 239 (1992).
238. Maogoto, New Frontiers, Old Problems: The War on Terror, supra note 11, at 
14.
239. Id.
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the [United States] could execute the military campaign it successfully 
launched against Iraq, does not currently exist. That lacuna was 
seemingly plugged with the ‘Bush Doctrine,’ that advocates pre-emptive 
strikes against rogue states and/or entities involved in terrorism.”240 The 
Doctrine’s reliance on the premise of pre-emptive self-defence resurrects 
the idea of a “right of self-preservation” that fell into disuse in the early 
part of the twentieth century with the prohibition of war and the legal 
demarcation of the limits of the right to self-defence outlined in the UN
Charter.241
C. Reflections on the Use of Force as a Counter-Terrorism Measure in 
Light of the UN Charter
1. Armed Attack and Self-Defence
Contrary to the intentions of the authors of the UN Charter, the system 
of collective security has been of little practical significance, and state 
aggression continues to be determined by the unilateral use of force by 
states.242 Commentators argue that, because the customary right of self-
defence includes action beyond armed attack, military force may be 
legally available as an option against terrorists, even if an armed attack 
has not occurred.
[a]lthough Article 51 refers to the right of self-defense “if an armed 
attack occurs,” the United Kingdom and the United States have 
consistently maintained that the right of self-defense also applies when 
an armed attack has not yet taken place but is imminent. This view of 
self-defense can be traced back to the famous Caroline incident of 
1837.243
This view holds that the presence of an armed attack is one of the bases 
for the exercise of the right of self-defence under Article 51, but not the 
exclusive basis.244 The sentiments of these commentators are also 
reflected by some major states.245 In support of such an expansive 
240. Id.
241. See id.
242. See Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, supra note 27, at 1620.
243. Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-Emptive Use of Force: 
Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 7, 12 (2003).
244. See James P. Terry, Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Law-Policy 
Analysis, 36 NAVAL L. REV. 159, 170– 71 (1986); Schachter, supra note 27, at 1633–34.
245. See Maogoto, New Frontiers, Old Problems: The War on Terror, supra note 11, 
at 30–32 (“. . . Israel and the U.S. have been particularly notorious in seeking to rely upon 
the concept of anticipatory self-defence on numerous occasions . . .”).
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interpretation of “armed attack,” certain international legal scholars 
“believe that state sponsorship and support of international terrorists 
constitutes a use of force contemplated by Article 2(4).”246 This is not an 
entirely idle argument considering that the scope and content of the 
prohibition of the use of force in contemporary international law cannot 
be determined by an interpretation of Article 2(4) alone. Rather, the 
provision must be read in context with Articles 39, 51, and 53. These 
articles contain a number of terms that, though related to one another, 
differ considerably in their meaning. Thus notions such as “use or threat 
of force,” “threat to the peace,” “breach of the peace,” “act of 
aggression,” “armed attack” and “aggressive policy” are used but do not 
receive any further explanation in the Charter.247 Neither legal writing 
nor state practice has clarified these terms beyond doubt. Nor have 
attempts within the framework of the United Nations led to a satisfactory 
interpretation. Therefore, there is still no sound basis for redefining the 
Charter’s prohibition of the use of force.
State practice (albeit restricted to only a few states, notably the United 
States and Israel) seems to support the view that terrorist bombings may 
constitute an armed attack justifying self-defence under Article 51. For
example, the United States justified its cruise missile attack against 
Sudan and Afghanistan following the 1998 terrorist bombings of the U.S. 
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya as an exercise of self-defence.248 The 
United States has considered terrorist bombings to be armed attacks for 
some time and has accordingly justified several U.S. military actions 
against states that have supported terrorists.249
It is significant that the Security Council characterized the terrorist acts 
as “armed attacks.”
In the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, it is also 
necessary to ask whether the concept of “armed attack” in Article 51 of 
the Charter is capable of including a terrorist attack . . . . There is, 
however, no a priori reason why the term should be so confined. There 
246. See RICHARD ERICKSON, LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST STATE-
SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 113 (1989).
247. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, arts. 39, 51, 53.
248. See Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 
of the UN Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 41, 49– 50 (2002).
249. Louis Henkin, The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 46 (1989); see also Letter Dated April 14, 
1986 From Acting Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the 
United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc S/17990 
(1986).
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is no doubt that terrorist acts by a state can constitute an armed attack 
and thereby justify a military response. The UN General Assembly 
included certain types of terrorist activity committed by states in its 
definition of aggression in 1974. Similarly, the International Court of 
Justice, in its judgment in the Nicaragua case in 1986, considered that 
covert military action by a state could be classified as an armed attack 
if it was of sufficient gravity. The level of violence employed on 
September 11, 2001 undoubtedly reached that level of gravity.250
This view was expressly affirmed by other international bodies 
including NATO and the OAS.251 This characterization may lead one to 
conclude that:
The international reaction to the events of September 11, 2001 confirms 
the commonsense view that the concept of armed attack is not limited 
to state acts. The UN Security Council, in its resolutions 1368 and 1373 
(2001), adopted in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, expressly 
recognized the right of self-defense in terms that could only mean it 
considered that terrorist attacks constituted armed attacks for the 
pur poses of Article 51 of the Charter, since it was already likely, when 
these resolutions were adopted, that the attacks were the work of a 
terrorist organization rather than a state.252
By recognizing the “inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence” in the preambles of Reso lution 1368 and Resolution 1373, the 
Security Council acknowledged that self-defence motivated the military 
strikes against the Taliban in 2001. 253
Nothing in the language of Article 39 or the rest of the Charter suggests 
that only threats emanating from states can fall within its scope. In 
recent years, the Security Council has had no hesitation in treating acts 
250. Greenwood, supra note 243, at 16–17.
251. North Atlantic Council, Statement on Collective Self Defense (Sept. 12, 2001), 
available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/is/international_security/terrorism/sept_11/sept_11_archive/statem
ent_by_north_atlantic_council_on_collective_self-defense.html (last visited Jan. 27, 
2006). The Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States, meeting in 
consultation, likewise invoked the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
in declaring that “these terrorist attacks against the United States of America are attacks
against all American States.”  Terrorist Threat to the Americas, OAS RC.24/Res.1/01 ¶ 1, 
OEA/Ser.F/II.24 (Sept. 21, 2001), available at
http://www.oas.org/OASpage/crisis/rc.24e.htm (last visited  Jan. 27, 2006).
252. Greenwood, supra note 243, at 17.
253. See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 196; G.A. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 
(Sept. 28, 2001) (“reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as 
recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368”).
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of international terrorism, whether or not “state-sponsored,” as threats 
to the peace for the purposes of Chapter VII of the Charter. Thus, even 
before September 11, 2001, the Council had characterized as a threat to 
international peace and security Libyan support for terrorism . . . .254
The main question is how the events of September 11th affect the 
interpretation of the “armed attack” requirement under the UN Charter.
Despite the assertion above, in the author’s view, the Security Council’s 
statement implies that the difficult question of whether the terrorist 
attacks constituted “armed attacks” depends on interpretation. As this 
author has noted,
Resolution 1368 is ambiguous on the issue. In its preamble, Resolution
1368 “recogni[ses] the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense in accordance with the Charter,” but in the operative part of the 
resolution describes the attacks as “terrorist attacks” (not armed 
attacks) that “represent a threat to international peace and security.” In 
summary, Resolution 1368 the resolution [sic] does not explicitly 
recognise that the right of self-defense applies in relation to any parties 
as a consequence of the September 11 attacks.255
Even if the right of self-defence extends beyond the “armed attack” of 
Article 51, serious hurdles must be overcome before a traditional theory 
of self-defence can be used to justify attacks against terrorists or terrorist 
facilities located in another state. If the anticipated action by terrorists is 
not sufficiently imminent, the right to use force is not available for 
purposes of deterrence.256 Some argue that even if the right of self-
defence extends beyond the “armed attack” requirement of Article 51, 
the UN Charter would not permit the use of force to punish an aggressor 
254. Greenwood, supra note 243, at 19.
255. Jackson Maogoto, War on the Enemy: Self-Defense and State-Sponsored 
Terrorism 4 MELB. J. INT’L L. 406, 434 (2003). By “recognizing the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter,” the preambular 
paragraph of Resolution 1368 appeared to imply that the terrorist acts in New York, 
Washington, and Pennsylvania represented an “armed attack” within the meaning of 
Article 51 of the UN Charter. A similar preambular paragraph was also included in 
Resolution 1373. Resolution 1373, supra note 253. 
 256. Terry, supra note 244, at 171. In his article, Terry makes the point that, given the 
rapid delivery capabilities of terrorist organisations, it is unrealistic to require that a state 
wait until an attack is imminent before responding. The Israelis used similar arguments to 
justify their attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility at Osirak and these arguments were 
rejected by the United Nations and the world community. See O’Brien, supra note 76, at
450–51.
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after a threat had passed, nor permit the use of force to deter a less than 
imminent threat.257 In any case,
if past terrorist actions by a group are too remote in time, the response 
by force is likely to be characterized as an illegal reprisal. It appears 
that if a right to use force in self-defense exists apart from an armed 
attack, it is a right that presents a very narrow window of opportunity. 
In fact, this window of opportunity, under the traditional criteria for 
self-defense, will almost never exist in the context of terrorist attacks. 
The traditional requirements for self-defense are simply too restrictive 
to reasonably respond to the threat posed by international terrorism.258
2. Pre-emptive Self-Defence
Under customary international law, the right of self-defence was 
judged by the standard first set out in the 1837 case of the Caroline, 
which established the right of a state to take necessary and proportional 
actions in anticipation of a hostile threat.259 Based on the Caroline
incident, anticipatory self-defence must be “necessary,” “proportional,” 
and take place “immediately.”260 As noted elsewhere in this Article, 
Article 51 of the UN Charter is generally taken as an authoritative 
definition of the right of self-defence. However, scholars and states alike 
have continued to debate whether the enactment of Article 51 subsumed 
customary international law and extinguished the concept of anticipatory 
self-defence, or whether it simply codified a right that continues to exist 
257. Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military 
Force, 18 WIS. INT’L L.J. 145, 162 (2000).
258. Id. at 165–66.
259. 2 JOHN BASSET MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409–14 (1906). The 
“affair of the Caroline” involves a U.S. ship (“Caroline”) being used by U.S. citizens to 
transport reinforcements to Canadian territory in support of insurgents battling Great 
Britain’s rule. Id. at 409. A small British force crossed into U.S. territory and destroyed 
the Caroline. Id. at 409–10.Great Britain defended its action on the grounds that it was a 
necessary act of self-defence. Id. at 410. The case is illustrative of a state’s right to 
undertake necessary actions in “anticipatory” self-defence of an impending, though not 
necessarily imminent, hostile attack. Another case on point is the Corfu Channel Case 
(U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9), which has been cited for the proposition that the 
International Court of Justice recognised a residual right to reprisal remaining in the 
international legal order, the Charter of the United Nations notwithstanding. Roda 
Mushkat, Is War Ever Justifiable? A Comparative Survey, 9 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 227, 252 (1987).
260. See Roberto Ago, Addendum to the 8th Report on State Responsibility (pt.1 
concluded), [1980] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 13, 68–9, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/ADD.5–7 
(describing requirements frequently viewed as essential conditions for admissibility of 
self-defence pleas).
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with all its attendant doctrines under customary international law. The 
answer is in the interpretation.
Proponents of the continuing customary right to pre-emptive self-
defence have cited the impracticability of applying a literal interpretation 
of Article 51 in an age of advanced weapons, delivery systems, and 
heightened worldwide terrorist activity.261 Adherents argue the absurdity 
of requiring a state to refrain from taking action on its own behalf when 
an opposing state is preparing to launch an attack.262 Given the 
devastating potential of modern weapons and the swiftness of delivery to 
their intended targets, denying a state the right to act in advance of a 
pending attack effectively denies any defence at all. The same rationale 
applies to states threatened with impending terrorist attacks on their 
citizenry or property.
Some scholars have noted that it cannot be supposed that the 
inviolability of territory is so sacrosanct as to mean that a state may 
harbor within its territory the most blatant preparation for an assault upon 
another state’s independence with impunity; the inviolability of territory 
is subject to the use of that territory in a manner which does not involve a 
threat to the rights of other states.263 Further supporting this position is 
that there is no literal requirement under Article 51 that a foreign 
gov ernment itself directly undertake the attack to which a state responds. 
Thus, the harboring of terrorists may give rise to legitimate, legal 
justification for anticipatory military intervention. Any such claim, 
however, is still fundamentally one of self-defence, and still restricted by 
threshold requirements, including imminence, necessity, and 
proportionality.264
Some scholars have gone as far as to argue that a right of truly 
anticipatory self-defence has emerged outside of Article 51, based not on 
pre-existing customary law, but on the availability of weapons capable of 
261. Maogoto, Rushing to Break the Law, supra note 31, at 30 –31.
262. See generally Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defence
(A Call to Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 25 
(1987).
263. BOWETT, supra note 64, at 191–92; see also ERICKSON, supra note 245, at 109.
264. See Sean M. Condron, Justification for Unilateral Action in Response to the Iraqi 
Threat: A Critical Analysis of Operation Desert Fox, 161 MIL. L. REV. 115, 147 (1999). 
Some scholars would further limit the right of anticipatory self-defence, adding, inter 
alia, last resort, reasonableness, and a requirement of reporting to the UN Security 
Council. See also ERICKSON, supra note 245, at 145–50.
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mass destruction.265 Thomas Franck accounts for the emergence of a 
viable doctrine of anticipatory self-defence through
the transformation of weaponry to instruments of overwhelming and 
instant destruction. These [weapons] brought into question the 
conditionality of Article 51, which limits states’ exercise of the right of 
self-defense to the aftermath of an armed attack. Inevitably, first strike 
capabilities begat a doctrine of “anticipatory self-defense” . . . . 266
Other scholars opine that in a nuclear age, there are potentially 
devastating consequences for prohibiting self-defence unless an armed 
attack has already occurred, leading states to prefer the interpretation 
permitting anticipatory self-defence.267 Christopher Greenwood argues 
further that,
this view accords better with state practice and with the realities of 
modern military conditions than with the more restrictive interpretation 
of Article 51, which would confine the right of self-defense to cases in 
which an armed attack had already occurred . . . 268
Greenwood goes on to undertake a critical analysis of “Operation 
Enduring Freedom” against the benchmarks of “necessity,”
“proportionality” and “imminence.” He notes that,
[t]he pre-emptive action that the United States and its allies took 
against Al- Qaeda in Afghanistan was . . . a lawful exercise of the right 
of self-defense. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that self-
defense would cover every military action that the United States or an 
ally might want to take against Al-Qaeda (or other terrorist groups) in 
other countries. The use of force in Afghanistan fell within the concept 
of self-defense because the threat from Al-Qaeda was imminent and 
because Afghanistan was quite openly affording sanctuary to large 
numbers of Al-Qaeda personnel. These considerations will not 
necessarily be present in every case.269
There are, of course, debates as to whether “Operation Enduring 
Freedom” met the benchmark of proportionality. The U.S. case is not 
helped by calls for “regime change” in relation to rogue states which the 
United States is keen to put out of business, especially when they seek to 
265. BOWETT, supra note 64, at 191–92; see also ERICKSON, supra note 246, at 142–
43.
266. Thomas M. Franck, When, If Ever, May States Deploy Military Force Without 
Prior Security Council Authorization?, 5 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 51, 57–58 (2001).
267. Greenwood, supra note 243, at 15.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 25.
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develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction. Assuming for the 
moment that the U.S.-led operation in Afghanistan simply altered the 
balance of power in the civil war, when we juxtapose “Operation 
Enduring Freedom” against “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” significant legal 
questions are left open. As Michael J. Kelly notes,
[u]nilaterally, the United States articulated its right to act preemptively 
to eliminate the threat posed by a potentially nuclear-armed Iraq. 
However, because the existence of an imminent threat could not be 
established, when the president brought the old anticipatory self-
defense doctrine back to life, he eliminated that threshold and replaced 
it with the showing of only an “emerging” threat.270
Kelly further avers that, in the absence of a link between Iraq and Al 
Qaeda, the United States sought a doctrine that would legitimize an 
attack on Baghdad.271 Considering that
a plain reading of Article 51 disallows striking Iraq absent an armed 
attack, the Bush Administration is required to return to the legal history 
books and pull out another disused doctrine to justify any unilateral 
military action it may take. The one that seems to fit best, albeit 
imper fectly, is the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense.272
Notwithstanding the allure of a policy of anticipatory self-defence, 
there is little basis for such an extension of the UN Charter’s right to self-
defence. In justifying its attacks on Iraq, the United States relied on the 
concept of anticipatory self-defence, while seeking to dilute the Charter’s 
prohibition with customary international law. UN Charter aside, there is 
no basis in international law to support the doctrine of “pre-emption”
encompassing a right to respond to threats that might materialize at some 
time in the future. The test is clear—imminence, which connotes 
immediacy, is required to trigger self-defensive actions. A broad right of 
anticipatory self-defence premised on a new standard of “emerging 
threat” would introduce dangerous uncertainties relating to the 
determination of potential threats justifying pre-emptive action. With this 
determination being state-based, the probability of opportunistic 
interventions justified as anticipatory self-defence will rise. After all, the 
reality is that only states with the military muscle will be able to make 
use of this avenue and unilateral action will inevitably be colored by 
national interest considerations. The development of such a right will 
270. Kelly, supra note 87, at 2.
271. Id. at 22.
272. Id.
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likely prompt potential targets into striking first—to use rather than lose 
their biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
3. Reprisals
With regard to reprisals, the text of the UN Charter represents a 
conventional rejection of the just-war theories of retribution abandoned 
in the seventeenth century. 273 The purpose of the United Nations is to 
limit the use of force in international matters and to provide a forum for 
the resolution of conflict so as to prevent the need for war. In the history 
of the United Nations, there have been authoritative condemnations of 
both pre-emptive and retaliatory reprisal actions.274 It seems safe to 
conclude that both are widely expected to be inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations and are, therefore, proscribed under 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
Previous military actions by the United States against terrorist-
supporting states elicited varying responses from the international 
community and the United Nations. In the case of the 1986 raid on 
Libya, the United States was largely condemned.275 The UN General 
Assembly adopted a resolution condemning the United States for the 
attack by a vote of 79 to 28, with 33 abstentions.276 The UN Secretary
General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, stated that the U.S. action violated 
international law.277 Though a UN Security Council resolution echoing 
the General Assembly’s sentiment was vetoed by the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and France, France did call the air strikes “reprisals 
273. Article 2(3) of the UN Charter states: “All members shall settle their international 
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and 
justice, are not endangered.” U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
states: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 
4.
274. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 188, ¶2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/188 (Apr. 9, 1964); S.C. Res. 316,
¶2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/316 (June 26, 1972). See also Richard Falk, The Decline of 
Normative Restraint in International Relations, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 263, 266–67 (1985). 
See generally Geoffrey M. Levitt, International Law and the U.S. Government’s 
Response to Terrorism, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 755 (1986).
275. Maogoto, New Frontiers, Old Problems: The War on Terror, supra note 11, at 
34.
276. G.A. Res. 41/38, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 34, U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/41/38 (Nov. 20, 1986).
277. Michael Ratner & Jules Lobel, Bombing Baghdad, Revisited: Lawful Self-Defense 
or Unlawful Reprisal? CONN. L. TRIB., July 19, 1993, at 24.
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that itself revives the chain of violence.”278 In contrast, the United States’
1993 cruise missile attack on Baghdad in response to the foiled Iraqi 
assassination attempt on former President Bush was met with support or 
tacit acquiescence.279 In response to the U.S. presentation before the UN
Security Council, the representatives of other member states either 
expressed support for the U.S. action or refrained from criticizing it; only 
China questioned the attack.280 The General Assembly took no action.
Five years after the cruise missile attacks on Baghdad, world reaction 
to the 1998 U.S. strikes against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan 
was mixed. Western European nations supported the U.S. actions to 
varying degrees, while Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared he was 
“outraged” by the “indecent” behavior of the United States.281 China 
issued an ambiguous statement condemning terrorism, and Japan said it 
“understood [America’s] resolute attitude towards terrorism.”282
The aforementioned incidents were wrapped up in the rhetoric of self-
defence and retaliation, leading to the observation that, although the 
prevailing view is that reprisals are illegal, states may still engage in 
them.
For example, the 1986 bombing of Libya is cited as a peacetime 
reprisal and not an act of self-defense. Therefore, while writers state 
emphatically that reprisals are illegal, state practice continues to resort 
to them on occasion, cloaking them in terms of self-defense while 
remaining careful to comply with Naulilaa criteria.283
V. CONCLUSION
The international community has long been uneasy with the use of 
military action as a counter-measure against terrorism. In 1986, when the 
United States bombed Libya in response to a terrorist act, President 
Reagan called the action “pre-emptive” on the ground that there was 
278. Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal 
Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 182, 187 (1987).
279. See Stephen Robinson, UN Support for Raid on Baghdad, DAILY TELEGRAPH 
(London), June 28, 1993, at 1; Craig R. Whitney, European Allies Are Giving Strong 
Backing to U.S. Raid: Arab Governments Critical, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1993, at A7.
280. Stanley Meisler, UN Reaction Mild as U.S. Explains Raid, L.A. TIMES,  June 28, 
1993, at A1.
281. Phil Reeves, Outraged Yeltsin Denounces “Indecent” U.S. Behavior, 
INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 22, 1998, at 2.
282. See id.
283. Kelly, supra note 87, at 13.
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already a pattern of Libyan terrorist actions.284 The justification did not 
go over well with the international community. Roughly a decade later, 
in 1998, after terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, 
the United States fired cruise missiles on Sudan and Afghanistan.285
President Clinton argued that there was compelling evidence that the Al 
Qaeda terrorist network was planning to mount further attacks against 
Americans, and he was thereafter entitled to act.286 Apart from a few 
western governments, which approved or kept quiet, most states 
condemned the Clinton air strikes.287 Conversely, the 2001 U.S. bombing 
of Afghanistan was widely supported by the international community. 
But in 2003, when the United States launched military action against 
Iraq, it did so against a background of protests from a large section of the 
inter national community, “squandering away the legal and moral capital 
it had gained in the action against Afghanistan.”288
The attacks of September 11th, the response by the United States, and 
the international community’s approval of the military action in 
Afghanistan represent a new paradigm in international law relating to the 
use of force. Previously, acts of terrorism were seen as criminal acts, 
carried out by private, non-governmental entities.289 In contrast, the 
September 11th attacks were regarded as an act of war.290 This 
effectively marked a turning point in the long-standing premise in 
international law that force, aggression, and armed attacks are 
instruments of relations between states.291 Terrorism was no longer 
merely a serious threat to peace and stability to be combated through 
domestic and international penal mechanisms; use of force was now seen 
as an attractive and satisfying counter-measure in managing terrorism. 
However, subsequent U.S. military action in Iraq was shrouded in 
confusing legal justifications and questionable, even faulty evidence. 
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This has raised skepticism among scholars and the international 
community that self-defence was used and misused, thus preventing the 
evolution of any meaningful state practice.
As a result of the United States’ aggressive policy, certain discarded 
pre-UN Charter doctrines are being revived in one form or the other, 
notably the concept of pre-emptive or anticipatory self-defence. Some 
critics have warned against the inherent dangers of resurrecting such pre-
Charter doctrines, noting that:
One of the very reasons the world community decided to do away with 
them was to reduce legal justifications for, and thus the possibility of, 
unilateral military action. The pre-Charter doctrines were used 
erratically and unreliably prior to 1945. Now, if these doctrines are 
returned to service by the world’s superpower and are allowed to pass 
into customary practice once again, we will find ourselves in a time 
warp back to 1945—a period of fear, uncertainty and suspicion; a 
period of global dominance by a handful of nations; a period defined by 
the geopolitics of raw power and militaristic influence; a period of 
instability devoid of collective security. Even more disturbingly, some 
of the re-articulated rules have been watered down to allow more 
latitude in unilateral action.292
However in a spirited defence of pre-emptive action, other scholars 
assert that: “[w]aiting for an aggressor to fire the first shot may be a 
fitting code for television westerns, but it is unrealistic for policy-makers 
entrusted with the solemn responsibility of safe-guarding the well-being 
of their citizenry.”293 However, these critics are missing the central 
point—when military action is undertaken, things get real—real bombs, 
real missiles, real deaths. Unilateral state sponsored military action must 
not be based on mere apprehension backed by dubious or unclear 
intelligence. Once the military action is over it cannot be unmade by 
commissions of inquiries or concessions that perhaps a few facts were 
overstated. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in remarks regarding 
anticipatory self-defence during the opening of the 58th session of the 
UN General Assembly in September 2003, summed up the dilemma 
thus:
Article 51 of the Charter prescribes that all States, if attacked, retain the 
inherent right of self-defense. But until now it has been understood that 
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when States go beyond that, and decide to use force to deal with 
broader threats to international peace and security, they need the unique 
legitimacy provided by the United Nations. 294
Annan concluded that in light of the reality of weapons of mass 
destruction “[w]e have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment 
no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was 
founded.”295
The UN Charter seems to present a neat and tidy regime on the use of 
force. Nonetheless it reflects the drafters’ singular focus on creating a
political system to govern conflicts between states and does not directly 
address the subtler modes in which terrorists began to operate in the post-
World War II period.296 The drafters did not contemplate the existence of 
international terrorists nor “fully anticipate the existence, tenacity and 
technology of modern day terrorism.”297 In view of the fact that terrorist 
groups appear to have reached a global sophistication, there is little doubt 
that international terrorism presents a threat with which traditional 
theories for the use of military force are inadequate to deal, and were 
unanticipated when the UN Charter was drafted.298 The international 
community has no option but to develop new strategies within the rubric 
of international law to deal with terrorism and the reality that 
international law seems to restrict the use of military force to actions in 
self-defence.
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